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“Computer Says No!”: The Impact of 
Automation on the Discretionary 
Power of Public Officers  
Doaa Abu Elyounes* 
ABSTRACT 
The goal of this Article is to unpack the “human in the loop” 
requirement in the process of automation. It will analyze the impact of 
automation on street-level bureaucrats and lay out the steps policy 
makers need to take into account to ensure that meaningful human 
discretion is maintained. This issue is examined by comparing two 
algorithms related to the use of automation to detect and investigate 
fraud in welfare benefits. The first algorithm is used by Michigan’s 
Unemployment Insurance Agency for detecting and investigating 
unemployment fraud. This is a draconian algorithm with the ability to 
automatically decide to cut an individual’s benefits and collect debts. 
The second algorithm is used in the Netherlands by the Ministry of 
Social Affairs and Employment to detect different types of welfare fraud. 
It aids human fraud examiners and it automates only the process of data 
collection and analysis.  
This Article concludes that both algorithms could do more to 
maintain meaningful discretion. In Michigan, automation has left little 
room for street-level bureaucrats to apply discretion. Thus, this Article 
suggests that the algorithm be limited to a few segments of the 
unemployment fraud detection and investigation process. In contrast, 
the Netherlands’ algorithm allows street-level bureaucrats greater 
discretion. This discretion is also more meaningful because the human 
in the loop has a well-defined decision-making role. However, since the 
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algorithm is the de facto authority on who will be investigated, more 
steps should be taken to ensure that key decisions are overseen by 
humans. It is important to note that the lack of human agency was only 
one reason for the failures of the algorithms. Poor technical design and 
the sociopolitical context that the algorithms operated in were also 
responsible. The failures stemming from all three reasons are further 
explored in this Article. 
Although these cases demonstrate the importance of keeping a 
human in the loop in an automated process, questions such as what the 
role of the human should be and how to design the human-algorithm 
interaction have not received sufficient attention in academic literature. 
This Article sheds light on these issues.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Those who followed the comedy show “Little Britain” in the early 
2000s probably remember the apathy in David Walliams’s voice and 
expression when, as a banker or hospital receptionist, he blindly relied 
on a computer output and communicated the outcome to his clients.1 In 
today’s world of increased automation we might consider ourselves 
lucky if we got a chance to talk face to face with a public officer, even if 
their answer would be, “Computer says no.” 
 
 1. David Pereira, Computer Says No, TOWARDS DATA SCI. (Nov. 19, 2019), https://to-
wardsdatascience.com/computer-says-no-52a9c31cb8f2 [https://perma.cc/LVS9-62MY]. 
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Automation is creating a complex relationship between the 
service seekers and the service providers by using computer systems as 
an intermediary entity instead of human decision makers. This change 
can lead to significant frustration among public servants, whose hands 
feel tied because of the technology, and among citizens, who feel blocked 
by unsatisfactory responses and heartless machines.2 Although the 
biggest appeal of artificial intelligence (AI) was once the opportunity to 
create algorithms that could mimic the human brain and replace 
human decision-making, now there is a growing understanding that the 
most beneficial and effective algorithms are the ones that are designed 
to help humans and not replace them.3 In fact, among academics and 
practitioners alike, as well as in the internationally recognized 
documents for the use and development of AI, the need for human 
control of technology is well emphasized.4  
Street-level bureaucrats are public officers who work directly 
with individuals, such as police officers, teachers, and social workers in 
public agencies.5 The goal of this Article is to analyze the impact of 
automation on street-level bureaucrats, to understand the role and the 
degree of freedom that should be given to the human in the loop (i.e., 
the public officers who work with the algorithms), and to lay out the 
steps that policy makers need to take into account to ensure that 
meaningful human discretion is maintained. Street-level bureaucrats 
who worked face to face with individuals before automation play an 
important role in delivering public services by increasing accessibility 
and bridging the gap between the higher administration and the 
citizens.6 This Article examines this issue through two case studies 
where the detection and investigation of fraud in welfare benefits was 
 
 2. See Thomas Claburn, Fraud Detection System with 93% Failure Rate Gets IT  
Companies Sued, REGISTER (Mar. 8, 2017, 6:29 AM), https://www.theregister.com/2017/03/ 
08/fraud_detection_system_with_93_failure_rate_gets_it_companies_sued/ [https://perma.cc/ 
SX2C-VKC3]; see also Hendrik Wagenaar, Discretion and Street-Level Practice, in DISCRETION AND 
THE QUEST FOR CONTROLLED FREEDOM 259, 270 (Tony Evans & Peter Hupe eds., 2020). 
 3. Clare McDonald, Why AI Should Assist Humans, Not Replace Them, COMPUT. WKLY. 
(Sept. 7, 2018, 4:45 PM), https://www.computerweekly.com/news/252448295/Why-AI-should-
assist-humans-not-replace-them [https://perma.cc/4EG3-5NHN]. 
 4. JESSICA FJELD, NELE ACHTEN, HANNAH HILLIGOSS, ADAM CHRISTOPHER 
NAGY & MADHULIKA SRIKUMAR, PRINCIPLED ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: MAPPING CONSENSUS IN 
ETHICAL AND RIGHTS-BASED APPROACHES TO PRINCIPLES FOR AI 8 (2020), https://dash.har-
vard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/42160420/HLS%20White%20Paper%20Final_v3.pdf?sequence=1&is 
Allowed=y [https://perma.cc/T7RY-C2E5]. 
 5. Peter Hupe, Michael Hill & Aurélien Buffat, Introduction: Defining and  
Understanding Street-Level Bureaucracy, in UNDERSTANDING STREET-LEVEL BUREAUCRACY 3, 15 
(Peter Hupe, Michael Hill & Aurélien Buffat eds., 2015). 
 6. Evelyn Z. Brodkin, The Inside Story: Street-Level Research in the U.S. and Beyond, in 
UNDERSTANDING STREET-LEVEL BUREAUCRACY, supra note 5, at 25, 28–29. 
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wholly or partially automated. Although government officials and 
citizens both want welfare benefits to be allocated to those who really 
need them while catching and punishing those who are deceiving the 
government, the draconian way in which welfare-fraud detection 
algorithms operate is preventing vulnerable people from enjoying their 
basic rights and receiving access to vital aid. These algorithms have 
caused several false positives and unjustly cut benefits from people who 
need them.7 Unable to plead with a computer that cutting the benefits 
was a mistake, denied applicants are forced to confront walls of 
bureaucracy without help from intermediate public officials.8  
The two case studies discussed in this Article deal with two 
different systems that attempted to automate the same task.9 The  
first case study involves an algorithm deployed by the Michigan 
Unemployment Insurance Agency (UIA). The UIA purchased an 
algorithm for detecting and investigating fraud in unemployment 
benefits, the Michigan Integrated Data Automated System (MiDAS), 
from a private vendor.10 MiDAS sifts through a large amount of data, 
looking for any discrepancies between data submitted by the claimant, 
information gathered from the employer, and other databases.11 MiDAS 
is a decision-making algorithm because it has the authority to issue 
final decisions that have a significant financial impact on individuals. 
If any discrepancy is found, MiDAS attempts to communicate with the 
individual to investigate further.12 If the response of the individual is 
deemed insufficient by MiDAS, it automatically flags the case as 
fraudulent.13 MiDAS can then automatically cut benefits, garnish 
wages, and seize tax refunds.14  
The second case study takes place in the Netherlands, where the 
Dutch Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment implemented the 
 
 7. See, e.g., Claburn, supra note 2. 
 8. Jen Fifield, What Happens When States Go Hunting for Welfare Fraud, PEW 
CHARITABLE TRS. (May 24, 2017), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/ 
stateline/2017/05/24/what-happens-when-states-go-hunting-for-welfare-fraud [https://perma.cc/ 
DE34-MSR8]. 
 9. Karen Yeung, ‘Hypernudge’: Big Data as a Mode of Regulation by Design, 20 INFO., 
COMMC’N & SOC’Y 118, 120–21 (2017). 
 10. RASHIDA RICHARDSON, JASON M. SCHULTZ & VINCENT M. SOUTHERLAND, LITIGATING 
ALGORITHMS 2019 US REPORT: NEW CHALLENGES TO GOVERNMENT USE OF ALGORITHMIC 
DECISION SYSTEMS 20 (2019), https://ainowinstitute.org/litigatingalgorithms-2019-us.html 
[https://perma.cc/XX3M-L94X]. 
 11. Class Action Complaint & Jury Demand at ¶¶ 24–28, Cahoo v. SAS Analytics Inc., No. 
2:17-CV-10657-DML-RSW (E.D. Mich. Mar. 2, 2017) [hereinafter Cahoo Complaint]. 
 12. Id. ¶¶ 31, 41. 
 13. Id. ¶ 28. 
 14. Id. ¶ 102. 
456 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.  [Vol. 23:3:451 
System Risk Indication (SyRI) in order to help prevent all types of 
welfare fraud.15 Unlike MiDAS, SyRI only automated the data 
collection and analysis phase in order to assist fraud examiners in 
making final decisions, but it does not make or execute any decision on 
its own.16 SyRI collects and analyzes up to seventeen different data 
types, including data about employment, education, accommodation, 
and eligibility for benefits.17 If there is a discrepancy, a risk report is 
created and passed on to the relevant agency for further investigation 
and enforcement.18  
The deployment of both algorithms failed spectacularly. There 
was significant public backlash against the algorithms which led to 
lawsuits against the agencies deploying them.19 Both algorithms had  
a very high rate of false positives, which led to numerous false 
accusations of fraud20 that were neither detected nor solved  
promptly.21 The disastrous rollout of these algorithms exemplifies an 
alarming trend of using technology for undermining human rights,  
over-surveilling, and punishing the poor.22 In other words, lack of 
sufficient and meaningful human agency was not the only reason for 
the failure of the algorithms. Two additional causes—poor technical 
design and the sociopolitical context in which the algorithms  
operate—are later addressed and analyzed. Although incorporating 
meaningful human discretion is a very important step, that alone will 
not fix all failures of the examined algorithms. 
The discretionary power of street-level bureaucrats and fair and 
transparent administrative procedures are the two primary tools that 
the law provides for balancing between legislating universal rules  
and adjudicating individual cases. Automation has the potential to 
jeopardize those mechanisms because automation reduces the room of 
discretion by nature. In addition, the secrecy and opaqueness of  
data-processing algorithms make their decisions difficult to review for 
 
 15. RICHARDSON ET AL., supra note 10, at 24. 
 16. Koen Vervloesem, How Dutch Activists Got an Invasive Fraud Detection Algorithm 
Banned, ALGORITHM WATCH (Apr. 6, 2020), https://algorithmwatch.org/en/story/syri-netherlands-
algorithm/ [https://perma.cc/7HHM-3LUE]. 
 17. Profiling and SyRI, PUB. INT. LITIG. PROJECT (Nov. 12, 2015), 
https://pilpnjcm.nl/en/dossiers/profiling-and-syri/ [https://perma.cc/386E-KLGW]. 
 18. See RICHARDSON ET AL., supra note 10, at 24. 
 19. See id. 
 20. See Claburn, supra note 2; see also Amos Toh, Welfare Surveillance on Trial in the 
Netherlands, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Nov. 8, 2019, 10:28 AM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/11/08/ 
welfare-surveillance-trial-netherlands [https://perma.cc/EWT9-4N9B]. 
 21. See Toh, supra note 20. 
 22. Philip Alston (Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights), Rep. of the 
Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights, U.N. Doc. A/74/493 (Oct. 11, 2019). 
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errors.23 Therefore, this Article analyzes how discretion can be 
maintained despite automation and contribute to the design of fair and 
transparent administrative procedures. First, Part II discusses the 
evolution of street-level bureaucracy, discretionary power, and the 
impact of different technological changes on street-level bureaucrats. 
Part III introduces the two cases and lays the groundwork for the  
rest of the discussion about street-level bureaucracy, discretion, and 
automation. Part IV discusses the sociopolitical context in which the 
algorithms are operating. Issues related to discretion are broken into 
two parts: Part V discusses whether there is still room for street-level 
bureaucrats to apply their discretion after automation by exploring 
which domains and tasks were automated in each algorithm, and what 
degree of discretion was transferred to the engineers and the technology 
itself. Part VI discusses whether the discretion left for street-level 
bureaucrats is meaningful by examining internal factors related to the 
human-algorithm interaction and external factors related to the 
interaction between the level of discretion, or lack thereof, and other 
safeguards, such as due process, accountability, and transparency.  
This Article concludes that both algorithms failed in considering 
the impact of the automation on vulnerable groups. Michigan, which 
pays the fewest number of weeks of unemployment benefits in the 
nation and imposes a 400 percent penalty with interest for wrongly 
obtaining money, deployed MiDAS with an intent to minimize welfare 
payouts.24 Meanwhile, SyRI was deployed only in poor municipalities 
without any indication that residents of these neighborhoods were 
involved in higher rates of welfare fraud.25 In addition, the allocation 
and termination of welfare benefits is a sensitive domain that requires 
human oversight, which makes it unsuitable for full automation and 
decision-making algorithms. If technology is to be used, decision-aiding 
algorithms that are restricted and guided by street-level bureaucrats 
who are familiar with the domain and the population are the proper 
solution.  
Both algorithms can do more to maintain meaningful discretion. 
For MiDAS, street-level bureaucrats have little to no discretion because 
the algorithm is the decision maker. Thus MiDAS should be restricted 
to collecting and analyzing data. Although the fact that MiDAS is 
limited to unemployment fraud is a plus, as the domain itself is quite 
 
 23. See Paul B. de Laat, Algorithmic Decision-Making Based on Machine Learning from 
Big Data: Can Transparency Restore Accountability?, 31 PHIL. & TECHN. 525, 526 (2018). 
 24. MICHIGAN UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE AGENCY’S UNJUST FRAUD CLAIMS 1, 
https://waysandmeans.house.gov/sites/democrats.waysandmeans.house.gov/files/documents/Fact-
sheet%20-%20MiDAS.pdf [https://perma.cc/LH7U-2GX8] [hereinafter MIDAS FACTSHEET]. 
 25. Toh, supra note 20.  
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narrow, more authority should be given to street-level bureaucrats to 
apply their discretion and expertise, and that authority needs to be 
clearly defined. Conversely, in SyRI street-level bureaucrats have more 
room to intervene. The discretion is also more well defined than in 
MiDAS, as it is clearer what the role of the human in the loop is—to 
look for false positives and to further investigate cases flagged by SyRI. 
However, since SyRI is de facto deciding who will be investigated and 
who will not, more steps should be taken to ensure that humans are 
involved in key decisions. For example, if SyRI flags a case as 
suspicious, the case could be put under surveillance for up to two years. 
Because SyRI operates so opaquely, it is unknown when there is any 
human involvement before deciding to place each case under 
surveillance and for how long. In addition to being a safeguard for 
automation, human discretion also plays an important role in 
complying with other safeguards. Both MiDAS and SyRI can do more 
to facilitate the interaction between the human in the loop and other 
important safeguards.  
Discretion is a safeguard for maintaining unmediated 
communication between the individual applicant and the public agent 
making the final determination. The human factor is the element that 
connects the dots and makes sense of the process; it is what makes the 
final decision more humane. As Part II illustrates, in recent years, there 
have been significant changes in the way public officers were perceived 
and their expertise is valued much more under the new public 
management approach. The argument that this Article puts forward is 
that, if not governed properly, the rise of automated tools that are 
taking discretion away from street-level bureaucrats could move public 
administrations backward toward the traditional approach and 
degrade the quality of service that citizens are receiving.  
Thus, the following diagram summarizes the steps that have to 
be taken in order to ensure sufficient and meaningful discretion, steps 
that will be discussed in more detail throughout this Article.  
  




How to maintain sufficient and meaningful room for  
discretionary street-level bureaucracy? 
 
Sufficient Meaningful 











  How broad is the 
automated domain? 
Large-scale  
bureaucracy or  
system-level  
bureaucracy? 
  What part of the 





  What is the  
automated task?  
A rule or a standard? 
 
  Planning 
What is the machine 
learning technique 
that will be used and 
why? 
 Data engineering 
What is the data set  
composed of? 
  Modeling 
What is the  
operational logical  
sequence of the  
algorithm? 
  Testing and  
maintenance 
How often is the  
algorithm  
revalidated? 
  How determinative 
is the algorithmic  
outcome? 
Yes, no, or a scale of  
eligibility levels?  




Before and after the  
automation? 
  How ready are the 
institutions for  
automation? 
Planning, training,  
supervision, and  
rearranging roles within 
the organization? 
  How involved are 
the street-level  
bureaucrats in the 
automation process? 
Fully, partially, not at 
all? 
 
  Due process 
Lack of human  
discretion harms  
individuals’ right to  
receive a proper notice 
about the allegations, 
to be heard, and to  
appeal the decision.  
  Purpose limitation 
Human agency would 
ensure that the “big 
guns” of surveillance 
are used only when  
really needed.  
  Data minimization 
Human involvement 
would ensure that  
biased and  
discriminatory patterns 
are excluded from the 
processing. 
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II. THE IMPORTANCE OF DISCRETIONARY STREET-LEVEL BUREAUCRACY 
AND ITS IMPACT ON WELFARE SERVICES 
The purpose of this Part is to provide a theoretical background 
for the discussion of the impact of automation on street-level 
bureaucrats and their discretion. This Part begins with a brief overview 
of the role of street-level bureaucrats in delivering public services and 
the importance of discretion in general. Then, it focuses on the 
characteristics of the discretion of welfare officers in particular. In 
addition, this Part discusses the impact of technology on street-level 
bureaucracy in general and on welfare in particular.  
A. Street-Level Bureaucracy and Discretion 
In his seminal 1980 work, Street-Level Bureaucracy: Dilemmas 
of the Individual in Public Services, Michael Lipsky coined the  
term “street-level bureaucracy.”26 Street-level bureaucrats are public 
officers who work directly with individuals, such as police officers, 
teachers, and social workers in public agencies.27 One of the important 
characteristics that allows street-level bureaucrats to perform their jobs 
is discretion: the authority to interpret the policies that they are tasked 
with implementing and apply them to individual cases. Although 
street-level bureaucrats range in experience from specialized expertise 
that requires higher degrees to very brief training, their discretionary 
power places them in a unique position as “policy co-makers.”28 
Administrative discretion is an inherent part of the work of any public 
officer. Detailing the policies for executing any law after it is enacted, 
designing the relevant mechanisms within the responsible agency, 
prioritizing assignments, and delivering the services are all tasks that 
involve a high degree of discretion.29 Decisions such as whether to  
give someone a ticket for a traffic violation, to assign a student to a 
particular school or class, or to grant someone a loan are likewise all 
within the discretionary prerogative of street-level bureaucrats.30  
 
 26. See generally MICHAEL LIPSKY, STREET-LEVEL BUREAUCRACY: DILEMMAS OF THE 
INDIVIDUAL IN PUBLIC SERVICES 3 (1980) (“Public service workers who interact directly with  
citizens in the course of their jobs, and who have substantial discretion in the execution of their 
work are called street-level bureaucrats in this study. Public service agencies that employ a  
significant number of street-level bureaucrats in proportion to their work force are called  
street-level bureaucracies.”). 
 27. See Hupe, Hill & Buffat, supra note 5. 
 28. See id. at 16.  
 29. Justin B. Bullock, Artificial Intelligence, Discretion and Bureaucracy, 49 AM. REV. 
PUB. ADMIN. 751, 752–53 (2019). 
 30. See LIPSKY, supra note 26, at 3–4. 
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Under the traditional public management approach, hierarchy 
was strictly maintained.31 Discretion was not allowed except with 
permission from higher officials; low-level administrators were 
expected to strictly follow the rules of their instructors.32 The power of 
street-level bureaucrats had to be strictly controlled, so several 
hierarchical rules were imposed and lengthy guidelines detailing their 
exact duties were formulated in order to keep the power with the  
high-level officers.33 However, this approach was unsatisfactory. It 
created a bottleneck because street-level bureaucrats had limited power 
and could not meet the citizens’ needs, as their hands were tied, and 
could not use creativity or think outside the box in order to help citizens 
in need to access social benefits.  
Under the new public management approach, high-level officials 
recognized that low-level officials “on the ground” could aggregate 
substantial knowledge that made them better adjudicators.34 Hence, 
more power was given to the street-level bureaucrats who serve as the 
intermediary between the citizens and the higher public management.35 
Under this new approach, the concept of street-level bureaucracy was 
expanded and street-level bureaucrats were no longer exclusively found 
inside the government. Reforms led to contracting with nonprofit and 
for-profit organizations with the purpose of stimulating competition 
and better meeting the needs of citizens.36 It should be noted that the 
shift from the traditional public management approach to the new 
public management approach is an international phenomenon.37  
The traditional public management approach asserted by Max 
Weber has been recognized as suitable to the Industrial Revolution era 
where the role of policy making was attributed to politicians and the 
role of civil servants rested in their ability to execute the orders of 
politicians.38 This model contributed to the rise of large organizations. 
In the early 1990s, however, due to economic, social, historical, and 
 
 31. James P. Pfiffner, Traditional Public Administration Versus the New Public  
Management: Accountability Versus Efficiency, in INSTITUTIONENBILDUNG IN REGIERUNG UND 
VERWALTUNG: FESTSCHRIFT FUR KLAUS KONIG 443, 443–44 (A. Benz, H. Siedentopf & K.P.  
Sommermann eds., 2004). 
 32. Id. at 447–48. 
 33. See Steven Rathgeb Smith, Street-Level Bureaucracy and Public Policy, in THE SAGE 
HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 431, 435 (B. Guy Peters & Jon Pierre eds., 2d ed. 2012). 
 34. Cf. Tony Evans & Peter Hupe, Conceptualizing Discretion, in DISCRETION AND THE 
QUEST FOR CONTROLLED FREEDOM, supra note 2, at 1, 5. 
 35. See Smith, supra note 33, at 436. 
 36. Id. at 439–43. 
 37. See Yousif El-Ghalayini, New Public Management: An Assessment of Impact and the 
Influence on Public Administration, 6 PUB. POL’Y & ADMIN. RSCH. 18, 19–20 (2016).  
 38. See Pfiffner, supra note 31, at 444. 
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political factors, the need to reform public administration and improve 
public services emerged.39 When organizations became too big and 
complex, the centralization created a massive delay in execution and 
did not allow civil servants to respond quickly to changes.40 With more 
responsibilities for street-level bureaucrats, more mechanisms for 
holding them accountable were developed. Those mechanisms included 
stricter assessment of performance and empowering citizens to actively 
demand greater transparency.41 However, questions about how much 
discretionary power should be delegated to street-level bureaucrats and 
how they should be using it are the subject of a continuing and heated 
debate.  
The most common justification for discretion stems from the 
nature of laws and policies, which are often written in a very general 
manner and in broad terms in order to cover a wide range of cases. 
Thus, discretion is applied in each individual case to close gaps within 
the law and ensure equitable results.42 This is especially important in 
sensitive domains such as welfare and health care, where legislators 
may provide additional guidance but otherwise leave street-level 
bureaucrats to solve complex situations.43 And even if a law is specific 
and clear, it is not possible to anticipate all the potential implications 
of a specific law or policy, so discretion is needed for solving cases on 
which the law is silent. In these cases, the street-level bureaucrats use 
their reasoning abilities, acquired experience, and common sense.44 
However, discretion requires decision makers to diverge from 
the letter of the law on the books and create new and practical rules 
that fit individual cases. With this broad leeway, there is an increased 
risk that this power will be applied arbitrarily. Different officers might 
apply their discretionary power differently, and individual officers 
might handle similar cases inconsistently. This could lead to 
discrimination, interfere with individuals’ right to receive equal 
treatment, and prevent them from developing reliable expectations 
about what benefits they are eligible for.45 Additionally, delegating 
discretionary power to street-level bureaucrats could interfere with 
democratic governance. Unelected street-level bureaucrats might not 
apply policies as originally intended by the elected legislature. In 
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addition, discretion could undermine accountability; it is hard to hold 
street-level bureaucrats accountable for their actions because many fall 
within their prerogative power.46 The impact of new technology on  
this debate over administrative discretion and the extent of public 
administrators’ discretionary power, especially in the welfare context, 
are examined below.  
B. From Street-Level Bureaucracy to System-Level Bureaucracy 
The rapid deployment of advanced technology in the public 
sector starting in the 1990s and continuing now is significantly shaping 
administrative discretion and the degree of its influence. Governments 
are rapidly deploying advanced analytics and artificial intelligence 
algorithms in order to achieve two goals: (1) to improve the quality  
of services for their citizens, and (2) to deal with budget cuts  
and increasing workloads.47 The deployment of information and 
communication technologies reduced the direct contact of public officers 
with individuals, put a screen between the two, and shifted the focus of 
the officers from handling individual cases to more administrative 
tasks. Street-level bureaucracy was replaced with “screen-level 
bureaucracy” and later on by “systems-level bureaucracy.”48 In the 
screen-level bureaucracy era, caseworkers mainly fed data into 
standard electronic forms while the actual decision-making was done 
by the software.49 Screen-level bureaucracies were not very successful 
due to a lack of unanimity among systems and the fact that different 
components inside one system required focusing on the interrelations 
between processes.50 For example, consider the case of applying for a 
student grant: in the street-level bureaucracy era, an interview with an 
officer from the Ministry of Education determined whether the student 
would get the grant and what would be the amount. In the screen-level 
bureaucracy era, officers were tasked with detailing the criteria on 
which they based their decisions and they mainly feed data that 
students manually wrote into the computer. However, not all computer 
systems across all offices of the Ministry were consistent, and this led 
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to certain fixes being implemented in one office but not another or to 
bugs related to the fact that the same people appeared in a different 
system with a different status.51 Later on, system-level bureaucracy 
arose. System-level bureaucrats mainly develop strategies for designing 
IT systems tasked with automation and creating links between existing 
IT systems in the organizations in order to smooth the automation 
process.52 In this era, officials interact with their citizens even less since 
more people have internet access and can thus fill out forms on their 
own.  
This progression from street-level to system-level bureaucracy 
can be seen in the enforcement of traffic violations. Traditionally, police 
officers were responsible for enforcing speed limits and had the 
discretion of deciding which car to stop and whether to ticket the driver 
or just issue a warning.53 In the screen-level bureaucracy era, the police 
kept on doing their jobs but since all the agencies involved (police, 
prosecutors, courts, etc.) computerized their records, the police officer 
had access to a wide range of information and could make a more 
informed decision.54 Finally, by installing street cameras and 
delegating the task to a system-level bureaucrat, the discretionary 
power was eliminated.55 After the camera catches a violation and the 
system verifies the person to whom the car is registered, a ticket is 
issued automatically.56  
On the one hand, eliminating the administrative discretion led 
to a positive outcome: more neutral and uniform law enforcement. 
Anyone who violated the traffic laws could expect to be punished, and 
the risk that the police would stop mainly people of a certain class based 
on their appearance or the car they drove was eliminated. On the other 
hand, the criminal law system, which in the past required an individual 
assessment by an experienced judge, is now being replaced by a 
standardized judgment under administrative law. Although it is 
efficient to reserve the precious time of judges for cases more severe 
than traffic violations, the way the change has been implemented has 
hindered easy resolution of marginal cases, such as where the ticketed 
person wishes to convince the authorities that the traffic sign was 
missing.57  
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In modern system-level bureaucracies, public servants indeed 
have less discretionary power than they did before, and they are guided 
by more detailed and strict regulations on how to interpret standards.58 
In addition, physical interaction with citizens is significantly reduced, 
as public officers now work mainly behind the scenes on designing and 
operating the systems.59 In other words, the “technostructure” is now 
the operating core of each organization; the system is most powerful 
and the humans who remain in the process support the structure 
dictated by the automatic system. However, discretion has not been 
completely eliminated; it has merely shifted to new actors—the IT 
engineers who build and design the system.60 These data engineers are 
becoming the new street-level bureaucrats, but they are not focusing on 
individual cases. They approach the process with different skills, 
exporting data into mathematical formulas capable of identifying 
patterns and making predictions.61 The only cases processed by humans 
under the new regime are the “hard cases” that the machine is not able 
to deal with, although the machine still plays a role in flagging those 
cases.62 
There are several problems with this structure. First, engineers 
and data analysts are not public officers by training nor by definition 
(i.e., they do not interact with individuals and understand their  
needs, rather they are driven mainly by increasing efficiency), so the 
considerations that they take into account could lack governmental  
and democratic checks and balances. Second, since system-level 
bureaucracies are highly centralized and linked, other administrative 
agencies could be impacted as any error could create a chain reaction 
that would be hard to untangle.63 Third, the use of algorithms and 
automated systems increases the number of blind spots in the process, 
and although this creates more opportunities to apply discretion, these 
blind spots are often hidden so it is difficult to control the use of 
discretion and prevent its abuse.64 
Research on discretion is highly contextual and 
interdisciplinary, so it often requires bridging the gap between different 
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conceptions of freedom and power.65 Thus, the discussion about the 
proper governance mechanisms and the impact of automation has to be 
tailored to the domain at stake. The next Section discusses the evolution 
of street-level bureaucracy and administrative discretion in the context 
of welfare.  
C. Street-Level Discretion and the Welfare State 
Street-level agencies play a major role in the welfare system, 
where they serve as the mediators between individuals and the state 
and bridges between the official policy in the books and the policy in 
practice.66 Street-level bureaucrats have a dual role: they are formal 
gatekeepers because they grant benefits and services according to the 
rules, and they are also informal gatekeepers because they can use their 
discretion to rule for or against certain individuals according to their 
own interpretation of the aforementioned rules.67 And because informal 
gatekeeping is so difficult to trace, it is hard to hold bureaucrats 
accountable for it.  
Two major trends have contributed to shaping the current form 
of welfare services. First, as mentioned in the previous Section, is the 
shift from the traditional to the new model of public management. 
Under the traditional model, the idea was to create large-scale 
bureaucracies that would help citizens exercise their rights in the 
modern industrialized world.68 Welfare benefits were considered part  
of the social rights that the government ought to distribute, and  
welfare agencies were governmental agencies operating like large-scale 
bureaucracies and employing many street-level bureaucrats.69 
Although this was the general trend, there were differences between 
jurisdictions. While the European welfare states had more noticeable 
large-scale bureaucracies, the United States did not allocate the 
necessary resources for developing and maintaining such agencies.70 
The large-scale bureaucracies operated in a top-down manner, where 
the direction and tone were dictated by upper-level managers.71 Under 
this model, street-level bureaucrats were overloaded and were unable 
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to meet the citizens’ demands, so they had to ration services by slowing 
down processes—creating long queues and limiting access as a result.72  
Under the new public management model, welfare allocation 
became much more decentralized. In 1996 in the United States, 
Congress transferred much of the responsibility for welfare 
administration from the federal system to the states; thus, welfare 
services were subject to the financial capabilities of each state and the 
political willingness to support welfare initiatives.73 In Europe, the idea 
behind decentralization was to give street-level bureaucrats more 
responsibilities and to increase their level of engagement so that they 
would support broader policies instead of sabotaging them.74  
The second trend was the move from universalistic to selective 
social policies. While under a universalistic approach welfare benefits 
are made available to everyone as a social right, a selective approach 
distributes benefits only to those who need them the most and 
determines eligibility with financial tests.75 Supporters of the selective 
approach claim that if benefits are given on the basis of need, this will 
lead to better allocation of scarce public resources and enable the 
government to give more to the poor.76 However, believers in the 
universalistic approach adhere to the idea that equal distribution of 
benefits promotes solidarity and prevents labeling the poor as a burden 
on society.77 In addition, if benefits depend on income, this could 
encourage certain people not to work and instead rely on the benefits.78 
Traditionally, European countries, and in particular Scandinavian 
countries, have followed the universal model for the vast majority of 
benefits, while Anglo-American countries have adopted the selective 
model.79 In recent years, there has been a worldwide convergence 
toward the selective approach and means testing as a condition for 
receiving benefits.80 As part of this trend, street-level bureaucrats were 
instructed to “activate” clients by conducting training programs for job 
hunting, helping with job applications, and understanding the program 
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or skills needed.81 The selective approach, combined with activation 
policies, increased the use of discretion by street-level bureaucrats since 
the eligibility for benefits, and sometimes the total payout, was 
conditioned on complying with either protocols developed by the  
street-level bureaucrats or their general impression of the individual’s 
compliance.82 Distributing benefits on a selective basis can thus be a 
veiled but effective way to reduce the scope of coverage. While on its 
face the goal of the program remains the same—supporting those who 
are most vulnerable—creating subcategories of impairment increases 
the threshold for eligibility.83 It becomes harder to apply, and the people 
who are eligible could be unaware of their eligibility. 
D. The Impact of Technology on Street-Level Bureaucrats in the 
Context of Welfare  
The advanced technology used, including online platforms for 
applying for benefits, coupled with big data and surveillance 
mechanisms, is catalyzing the shift to the selective approach and 
enabling means testing. The trends that were discussed above 
regarding the influence of technology on administrative discretion are 
specifically relevant to the automation of welfare officers’ discretion. 
Surveillance technology significantly influences the degree of discretion 
street-level bureaucrats have in their decision-making. On the one 
hand, the vast amount of data generated by surveillance technology 
could increase the robustness of decision-making and enhance security 
since welfare officers have stronger grounds to base their decisions on.84 
In addition, automation could allow system-level bureaucrats to focus 
on the broader picture beyond individualized interactions, to identify 
patterns of discretion, and to engage with welfare issues that require a 
change.85 On the other hand, the use of surveillance technologies has 
many drawbacks. In liberal democracies, the use of surveillance 
technologies is mainly associated with a threat to freedom and an 
attempt by the government to enforce social order and manage its 
population.86 Surveillance technology can also contribute to the 
marginalization of certain communities by encouraging profiling and 
attaching labels to people, a particularly relevant issue for the cases 
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that will be discussed in this Article.87 Finally, research shows that 
when governmental agencies opted for automated processes, it became 
harder to seek some welfare benefits because the assessment is not done 
by experts but by a machine, which can assess a massive amount of 
cases faster but pays less attention to individual circumstances.88  
System-level bureaucracies have narrowed the discretionary 
power of caseworkers, who now focus on building and shaping the 
systems, but they still retain some power as to the type of information 
that they feed the system. The fact that caseworkers are no longer able 
to communicate face to face with their clients and listen to their 
struggles has been a major source of frustration and criticism among 
both caseworkers and clients.89 This element is particularly important 
because caseworkers are not only helping their clients understand their 
rights and apply for benefits but also serving as a bridge between what 
is often the “chaotic lifestyle” of the clients and the “ordered world” of 
bureaucracy, the latter of which requires the submission of extensive 
documents, keeping up with some payments, and other onerous 
requirements.90 In the era of system-level bureaucracy, the relationship 
between the caseworker and the individual is no longer central because 
faces and stories are turning into risk factors and variables in 
equations.91 These conflicts between the roles of caseworkers as social 
workers versus data analysts, and between efficiency, effectiveness, 
and scientific robustness versus individual needs in welfare, are at the 
core of the discussions in both the Michigan and the Netherlands case 
studies.  
III. AUTOMATION OF FRAUD DETECTION IN WELFARE BENEFITS IN 
MICHIGAN AND IN THE NETHERLANDS 
In this Part, two case studies about the automation of welfare 
fraud investigations will be discussed. The first involves an algorithm 
that automated the detection and investigation of fraud in 
unemployment benefits in Michigan, and the second involves an 
algorithm that automated the detection of welfare fraud in the 
Netherlands. The goal of this Part is to lay the groundwork for a more 
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detailed discussion of the different aspects of discretion that were 
automated and their impact on street-level bureaucracy.  
A. The Michigan Case: Detecting Fraud in Unemployment Benefits 
The Michigan Unemployment Insurance Agency (UIA) deployed 
the Michigan Integrated Data Automated System (MiDAS) in October 
2013.92 MiDAS superseded a thirty-year-old IBM program whose 
operation cost $10 million.93 The old program consisted of several 
systems and platforms, each responsible for a certain task.94 MiDAS 
attempted to gather all of UIA’s operational systems under one roof.95 
The goal of MiDAS was to provide real-time data sharing across 
functions in the UIA, enhance productivity, improve customer services, 
and ease compliance with changing regulations.96 MiDAS was 
developed by FAST Enterprises, which configured its GenTax 
commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) application to the needs and 
characteristics of the UIA.97 CSG Government Solutions, another 
private vendor, was tasked with overseeing and managing the project.98 
On the government side, the UIA and the Department of Technology, 
Management, and Budget oversaw the production and implementation 
of MiDAS.99 The design and implementation of MiDAS began in 2011 
and took approximately two years, after which additional components 
were gradually added.100 One of the major functions of MiDAS was to 
reduce the costs associated with the detection and adjudication of 
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alleged fraud in unemployment benefits.101 SAS, Inc. was brought in to 
implement the fraud detection project, which started in 2013 and was 
implemented in 2015.102 Its goals were reducing fraud in unemployment 
benefits distribution, identifying violations by linking data from 
different agencies, and recognizing patterns of fraudulent activity.103 
Unfortunately, MiDAS proved to be a shockingly ineffective algorithm 
that did not fulfill its promise. It generated mainly false positives, and 
approximately 93 percent of cases were wrongly flagged.104 MiDAS 
replaced approximately four hundred employees at the UIA who had 
been reviewing individual cases and potential discrepancies; this also 
reduced the number of public officers working with individuals from 260 
to 184.105 Before MiDAS was implemented, the caseworkers conducted 
interviews with individuals, dealt with any questions that were 
unclear, and used their discretion to determine why the individual was 
suspected of committing fraud, when fraud occurred, and how many 
weeks of benefits should be returned (if any).106 
MiDAS sifts through a large amount of data, looking for any 
discrepancies in the records of individuals who are currently receiving 
or have previously received UIA benefits.107 If any discrepancy is found, 
for example, between documents submitted by the employer and the 
information reported by the beneficiary, MiDAS automatically flagged 
the case for potential “claimant misrepresentation.”108 A common 
discrepancy is a mismatch between the reported reason for applying for 
the benefits by the employer and the employee. If the employee selected 
being fired and the employer selected termination of the employment, 
MiDAS did not understand that those are synonyms, and it flagged the 
case.109 Once the case has been flagged, MiDAS began the process of 
determining if the discrepancy constitutes fraud. MiDAS automatically 
issued a letter to the individual that questioned her eligibility, and it 
asked her to answer two questions: (1) “Did you intentionally provide 
false information to obtain benefits you were not entitled to receive?” 
 
 101. Id. This Article focuses only on the fraud detection component aspect and not any 
other UIA functions.  
 102. Id. 
 103. Id.  
 104. Claburn, supra note 2.  
 105. MIDAS FACTSHEET, supra note 24. 
 106. Telephone Interview with Tony Paris, Lead Att’y, Sugar L. Ctr. for Econ. & Soc. Just. 
(Feb. 7, 2020).  
 107. Cahoo Complaint, supra note 11, ¶¶ 24–28.  
 108. Id. ¶¶ 27–28. 
 109. Telephone Interview with Jennifer Lord, Partner, Pitt, McGehee, Palmer,  
Bonanni & Rivers (Jan. 1, 2020). 
472 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.  [Vol. 23:3:451 
and (2) “Why did you believe you were entitled to benefits?”110 Eight 
possible answers were listed, for example, “I needed the money,” “I did 
not understand how to report my earnings or separation reason,” and 
“Someone else certified (reported) for me.”111 The letter did not include 
individual explanations of why the case was flagged, and it did not give 
the individual an option to report that they were legitimately entitled 
to the benefits and that the information was reported in good faith.112 
This is one of the most troubling problems with MiDAS or any other 
algorithmic system that lacks meaningful overview. There is no room 
for the individual to explain the situation because even the most 
advanced language processing techniques would struggle to understand 
the meaning of any open statement that the individual provides.113 If 
the individual did not respond within ten days, or if MiDAS deemed  
the response unsatisfactory, it automatically determined the case as 
fraud.114 In 2016, the Michigan Office of the Auditor General conducted 
an audit of MiDAS and identified critical failures in its operation. The 
number of appeals of fraud determinations had increased exponentially 
from 2,280 to 22,473 after the deployment of MiDAS, and the state had 
to employ new judges to handle the flood of appeals, 92 percent of which 
were successful.115 In addition, the Auditor General criticized the lack 
of security measures in MiDAS that could cause losses or compromises 
of data.116 
The draconian way in which MiDAS operated led to the seizure 
of tax refunds, garnishment of wages, and imposition of high 
penalties.117 Thousands of individuals were falsely accused of 
committing fraud.118 At least a thousand of them had to file for 
bankruptcy and many are still suffering from the negative ramifications 
of a bad credit report that can limit their ability to conduct daily tasks 
such as renting an apartment, seeking employment, or obtaining 
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loans.119 Others pled guilty to fraudulent activity they did not commit, 
hoping to end the misery as fast as possible without considering 
consequences, such as being barred from certain professions like 
teaching and financial advising because of the moral turpitude 
associated with fraud.120 At least two individuals committed suicide 
because of the financial penalties imposed by MiDAS.121 After the news 
about MiDAS broke, legislation was passed that prohibited the UIA 
from making fraud determinations solely by computer program and 
mandated improved notice requirements.122 However, the UIA did not 
reveal information about what the oversight included.123  
Two class action lawsuits filed in 2015 attempted to challenge 
different aspects of MiDAS. The first was a class action lawsuit brought 
before the State of Michigan Court of Claims by Grant Bauserman and 
two others on behalf of a class of similarly situated individuals, against 
the Michigan UIA, alleging due process violations.124 The second case 
was a federal class-action lawsuit brought before the US District Court 
for the Eastern District of Michigan by five individuals and other 
similarly situated persons against the private companies that UIA 
contracted with for developing MiDAS and six decision makers at UIA 
in their individual capacity.125 Both cases are still in their early stages 
due to several attempts to move for dismissal on administrative 
grounds.  
B. The Netherlands Case: Detecting Welfare and Tax Fraud 
The algorithmic fraud detection system that operates in the 
Netherlands (SyRI) is different from MiDAS. On the one hand, it has 
fewer capabilities because it only automates data collection and 
analysis—it does not automatically determine any violation—and there 
is a considerable amount of human oversight included in the system.126 
On the other hand, SyRI is a large-scale system that is exposed to 
significantly much more data that comes from a broad range of 
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governmental agencies.127 It also simultaneously investigates different 
types of fraud in welfare benefits, and it has surveillance capabilities.128  
SyRI is an algorithmic system implemented by the Netherlands’ 
Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment with the goal of preventing 
social security, employment, and tax fraud.129 SyRI is an optional 
national project used only at the request of a municipality that wants 
to work together with other administrations.130 Five projects have been 
initiated throughout the lifetime of the algorithm but three of them 
were canceled in the early stages due to capacity problems, product 
delays, and because of doubts related to the privacy impact 
assessment.131 Two projects were eventually conducted in notably poor 
municipalities or poor neighborhoods in certain municipalities, which 
is one of the main criticisms of the system’s deployment.132 The system 
operates using a “neighborhood-centered approach risk model,” a model 
that is based on multidisciplinary intervention that ensures compliance 
with the law and fighting fraud while helping residents improve the 
quality of their lives and notifying them about benefits for which they 
might be eligible.133  
SyRI compiled and analyzed data from several governmental 
agencies, such as the municipality, the tax office, the employee 
insurance provider, the social security bank responsible for child benefit 
and pensions, the immigration authority, and the department 
responsible for the prosecution of labor law violations.134 The algorithm 
searched for discrepancies in the data and flagged the cases that posed 
a high risk of illegitimate conduct or noncompliance with the laws, 
which are put under surveillance for up to two years.135 At the end, if 
the case was still suspicious, a risk report was created and sent to the 
relevant agency for further investigation and debt collection if 
necessary.136 One example of a discrepancy would be if someone was 
receiving housing benefits without being registered at the address that 
is given on the forms. After a discrepancy was detected, an employee 
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from the Ministry of Social Affairs was tasked with examining the case 
and making sure that there were no false signals,137 for example, the 
individual lived in a retirement home where many people shared the 
same address. The data analyst would report such errors in order to 
adjust the model and prevent it from happening again.138  
On the technical front, the creation of the risk report was divided 
into two steps: data processing and data analysis.139 In the processing 
stage, the Benefits Intelligence Agency Foundation (Stichting 
Inlichtingenbureau [hereinafter IB]), a special foundation created to 
coordinate the SyRI project and the collaboration between the Ministry 
of Social Affairs and Employment and the municipalities, encrypted all 
identifying personal information, a risk classification was applied to the 
encrypted data, and the files of those who are flagged by the algorithm 
as high risk cases were decrypted.140 The foundation then passed the 
report to the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment for further 
investigation and was supposed to delete the data within four weeks.141 
The task of the Ministry was to investigate the report for research 
worthiness and discover issues like the retirement home, as in the 
example above.142  
The use of SyRI was authorized by Parliament in 2014 as part 
of a broader welfare reform.143 Its legality is anchored in Articles 64–65 
of the Wet structuur uitvoeringsorganisatie werk en inkomen 
(SUWI).144 According to Article 64, the purpose of cooperation between 
governmental agencies is to facilitate “integral government action with 
regard to the prevention and combating of unlawful use of government 
funds and government provisions in the field of social security and 
income-related arrangements.”145 Article 64 also emphasizes that the 
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processing of the collected data should be in accordance with the 
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR).146 Article 65 provides the 
legal basis for processing the data and outlines the seventeen types of 
data that can be processed, including work data, data about 
administrative sanctions such as fines, tax data, trade data, 
accommodation data, data about benefits including exclusion from 
benefits, education data, and more.147 Article 65 also sets the conditions 
for creating “risk reports” by SyRI: it must be “a finding of an increased 
risk of unlawful use of government funds or government facilities in the 
area of social security and income-related schemes”; aligned with the 
purpose stated in Article 64; and processed by designated personnel 
within the agency.148 
According to the authorities, €496,000 were saved as a result of 
discontinuation or recovery of state benefits and allowances due to 
SyRI.149 However, similar to MiDAS, SyRI had many technical flaws 
and it generated too many false positives. For example, one of the 
projects conducted in Capelle aan den Ijssel resulted in 62 violations 
out of 113 issued risk reports and tens of thousands of cases 
investigated.150 In the Netherlands, as in many other places, if people 
are marked in a governmental database as fraudsters, they will suffer 
severe consequences that are not easy to reverse even if the 
determination was the result of a mistake or computer error. People 
could lose their mortgages, social benefits could be blocked, and the 
information will be shared automatically with many governmental 
organizations, thus making the process of undoing the error much 
longer and more complicated.151  
Although SyRI did not execute automatic decisions to cut social 
benefits like MiDAS, there was a significant public backlash against the 
system, and the consequences of the government surveillance led 
nonprofit organizations and several individuals to file a lawsuit in the 
District Court of The Hague.152 The plaintiffs requested that the court 
declare the use of SyRI illegal on the basis of privacy violation, unlawful 
 
 146. Wet structuur uitvoeringsorganisatie werk en inkomen [SUWI] 29 november 2001, 
Stb. 2001, art. 64.  
 147. See Rechtbank den Haag [District Court of The Hague] 5 februari 2020, No.  
C-09-550982-HA ZA 18-388 (NJCM et al./State) ¶ 4.17 (Neth.). 
 148. Id. ¶¶ 4.18–4.15. 
 149. Braun, supra note 133. 
 150. Id. 
 151. NORBERT JANSEN, CALL FOR SUBMISSIONS: ON DIGITAL TECHNOLOGY, SOCIAL 
PROTECTION, AND HUMAN RIGHTS. 5–6 (2019), https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Pov-
erty/DigitalTechnology/ITCU.pdf [https://perma.cc/2DMR-S63Z]. 
 152. RICHARDSON ET AL., supra note 10. 
2021] AUTOMATION’S IMPACT ON BUREAUCRACY 477 
profiling of innocent citizens, the potential discriminatory effect of the 
system that was deployed mainly in poor cities, and the extent of the 
data sharing between entities.153 On February 5, 2020, the District 
Court of The Hague ruled in favor of the plaintiffs and declared Article 
65 of SUWI illegal.154 The court viewed the purpose of fighting fraud as 
legitimate and it encouraged the government to take advantage of new 
technology to combat unlawful use of public money.155 This is because 
social security is one of the pillars of Dutch society, since it is funded by 
public money, and it is crucial to fight against fraud in order to 
maintain the solidarity and trust that the Dutch people have in their 
government.156 However, the court ruled that the operation’s 
implementation violated basic human rights norms and that there was 
a lack of sufficient safeguards for the automation.157  
IV. SITUATING THE CASE STUDIES WITHIN THE SOCIOPOLITICAL 
CONTEXT 
Technical tools do not operate in a vacuum. They are developed 
in a specific context, often to fulfill a certain agenda, and they are 
shaped by the sociopolitical framework in which they operate.158 As 
mentioned earlier, the degree of autonomy of street-level bureaucrats 
was always in question, both under the traditional public management 
approach when they were controlled and later on when they were given 
more autonomy. This debate continues because street-level bureaucrats 
are perceived as representatives of the higher administration and carry 
out their agendas, thus exposing that their work is prone to political 
influence. This Part demonstrates how the failures and problems 
created by both MiDAS and SyRI cannot be attributed only to the 
inevitable consequences of automation—they are also a result of 
intentional policy choices. However, the question of whether welfare 
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fraud is a domain that should be automated in the first place must be 
addressed before diving into the specific claims related to the impact of 
automation on street-level bureaucrats and their discretion. 
Governmental reforms that are aimed at improving efficiency 
and accountability often shift, limit, or expand patterns of discretion, 
and those changes can hurt certain populations more than others.  
Thus, automation often leads to minimizing the discretion of  
street-level bureaucrats who work in welfare agencies, which in turn 
disproportionately impacts the poor and the vulnerable by limiting 
their rights and access to benefits.159 Virginia Eubanks, in her book 
Automating Inequality, discusses several examples of how welfare 
systems are designed to punish the poor and the disadvantaged and 
how automation has been used for decades for tracking, surveilling,  
and infringing on people’s rights.160 The Scientific Charity movement 
that arose in the United States as early as the 1870s focused on  
creating databases using the presumed characteristics of poverty (low 
intelligence, criminality, and unrestricted sexuality).161 Race played a 
major role in the analysis, and white poverty was treated differently 
than Black poverty.162 Later on, the deployment of technology led to  
a decrease in the number of people receiving benefits because  
few could deal with the resulting bureaucratic burden.163 Thus, the 
physical poorhouses of the nineteenth century were replaced with  
twentieth-century digital poorhouses—systems in which computers 
collected, analyzed, and stored a huge amount of data about families 
receiving public benefits. Instead of rationalizing the benefit 
distribution, the digital poorhouses profiled, policed, and punished the 
poor.164 On the international level, many researchers have highlighted 
the fact that although the right to social security has been recognized 
internationally and ratified in the United States and in the 
Netherlands, receivers of social benefits are treated as second-class 
citizens.165 They are looked at with suspicion and are subjected to 
infringement of their basic rights, including the right to privacy.166 
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Thus, cracking down on welfare fraud is part of a general trend of 
undermining the human right to social security and framing it instead 
as a rationed property right. Another phenomenon is the use of the 
media for alienating poverty and increasing racial polarization. 
Although Black poverty decreased dramatically during the 1960s, 
media stories about poverty continued to emphasize Black persons. 
Specifically, the representation of Black faces in poverty-related stories 
increased from 27 percent to 72 percent in a period of three years in the 
1960s.167  
The technological capabilities of tools used by governments, 
coupled with the risk of stigmatizing welfare recipients, have recently 
received special attention from the UN Special Rapporteur on extreme 
poverty and human rights, Philip Alston. Alston warns in a report of “a 
grave risk of stumbling zombie-like into a digital welfare dystopia.”168 
In the “digital welfare state,” technology is used for automating, 
predicting, surveilling, targeting, and punishing the poor.169 Alston 
highlights this move as a dangerous slippery slope, since technology is 
often presented as “an altruistic and noble enterprise designed to 
ensure that citizens benefit from new technologies, experience more 
efficient government, and enjoy higher levels of well-being.”170 But in 
fact, automation also leads to significant reductions in the welfare 
budget, imposes heavier sanctions on minor violations, narrows the 
number of people who get the benefits by scaring potential applicants 
away with new and complex procedures, and, most importantly for 
welfare recipients, eliminates human interaction with public officers.171 
As it will be explained below, the motives behind adopting both MiDAS 
and SyRI are quite complex and influenced by a convenient 
sociopolitical environment.  
A. The Sociopolitical Context Surrounding MiDAS  
In Michigan, civil rights organizations have pointed out various 
attempts by the governor at the time, Republican Rick Snyder, to 
minimize welfare support and deploy technology to cut costs and 
prioritize financial efficiency. Before getting elected as governor, 
Snyder worked in the private sector in different positions, including at 
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Gateway, a computer company.172 In Michigan, Snyder teamed up with 
state legislators to reform the budget plan and eliminate the state 
deficit.173 He restructured the Department of Licensing and Regulatory 
Affairs (LARA), whose mission was to reinvent government as customer 
driven and business minded.174 In terms of unemployment benefits, in 
2011, Snyder cut the number of weeks that Michigan citizens were 
eligible for unemployment benefits from twenty-six weeks to twenty 
weeks, the lowest in the nation at the time.175 In addition, the state of 
Michigan charges those who wrongly obtain unemployment benefits a 
penalty of 400 percent plus interest, the highest penalty rate charged 
by any state.176  
This policy is reflected in the way MiDAS operates. MiDAS is 
designed to declare fraud regardless of whether the claimant has in fact 
committed fraud. MiDAS was driven by the UIA’s desire to find fraud, 
and therefore almost every investigation was flagged as fraudulent for 
misconduct.177 Unsurprisingly, a major criticism of MiDAS was the 
number of false accusations. In fact, 93 percent of the cases flagged by 
MiDAS were incorrect.178 Hence, even if the purpose of adopting MiDAS 
was justifiable, the way it was implemented was not.  
In addition to the MiDAS case, another lawsuit was brought 
against the Michigan Department of Health and Human Services 
(MDHHS) because of a similar, draconian automation program. The 
algorithm in that case automatically disqualified individuals from 
receiving food assistance if they had any outstanding felony 
warrants.179 The Freedom of Information Act requests conducted in 
preparation for the lawsuit have revealed that MDHHS is planning to 
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use the findings of the algorithm as part of a media campaign that 
bullies poor individuals who rely on government benefits.180  
B. The Sociopolitical Context Surrounding SyRI  
In the Netherlands, the political backlash has been milder than 
in Michigan, and criticism centers on disappointment about what has 
happened to the welfare state.181 However, during the trial, the 
plaintiffs claimed that SyRI is not a standalone project but rather part 
of a governmental attempt to apply risk profiling in all sectors of 
society.182 In fact, several legislative proposals aim to ease data sharing 
between agencies.183 There has been a notable change in recent years 
in the fight against fraud. Imposing sanctions on fraudsters used to be 
rare; the starting point now is that citizens are guilty until proven 
innocent. If there is a suspicion that fraud is being committed, benefits 
are cut and will not be restored unless the claimants have the time, 
resources, and ability to appeal the decision and prove that they were 
entitled to the money.184 This is part of a broader issue with automation, 
which increases the power gap between the individual and the 
government by shifting the burden of tracking, identifying, and 
detecting the source of the error to the individual.185 
The main claim that received attention in the final judgment 
was the fact that all the projects involving SyRI took place in 
neighborhoods that are predominantly poor. Hence, SyRI might be 
targeting only the poorest and most vulnerable communities. The court 
ruled that the fact that SyRI has only been used in “problematic 
districts” is not illegal.186 However, given the large amount of data that 
is being processed, there is a risk that SyRI could unintentionally come 
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up with biased links, such as that between socioeconomic status and a 
likelihood of being involved in fraudulent activity.187  
Philip Alston submitted an amicus brief in support of the 
plaintiffs in the SyRI case that shed some light on the possible impact 
of SyRI on the poor and shows how this was a systematic approach that 
had been taking place in different forms for many years.188 Alston 
explained how the practice of targeting the poor started in the early 
2000s.189 Typically, the people targeted by SyRI are those less likely to 
be able to defend themselves against intrusions of their privacy. 
Various authorities, including the welfare ministries, tax authorities, 
police, and prosecutors started to collaborate on data sharing to detect 
fraud and illegal activities.190 In addition to mainly targeting poor and 
vulnerable communities, the government often settled for an algorithm 
with significantly high error rates. For example, a project called 
“Weatherproof” investigated sixty-three thousand individuals who 
received benefits intended for people who have no other form of income 
or assets.191 The fear was that people were reporting that they lived 
alone to receive higher benefits when they in fact were living with a 
companion.192 The goal of the data sharing was to examine water 
usage.193 If it was found to be too low at a certain address, that was 
considered an indication that the individual was committing fraud by 
living at another address with someone else while listing an unoccupied 
home.194 The algorithm investigated sixty-three thousand individuals 
and flagged four hundred cases for further investigation, but by the end 
of the process, only forty-two individuals committed fraud (0.07 percent 
of cases).195 In another project, while 119,000 welfare beneficiaries were 
examined, fraud was established in only 117 cases (0.1 percent of the 
cases), and benefits were ultimately terminated in only ten cases.196 As 
for SyRI, one project flagged forty-one cases as fraudulent, but the 
contribution was minimal since the relevant ministry was already 
aware of those cases from their ongoing, unassisted investigations.197  
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One interesting comparison that Alston makes in his amicus 
brief is between governmental attempts to crack down on fraudulent 
crimes committed by the poorest class and fraud crimes committed by 
upper-middle class citizens.198 A pilot project conducted by the tax 
authority attempted to examine whether individuals who were driving 
company cars were also using them for private purposes without paying 
the relevant tax.199 The project failed because the tax authority 
concluded that relying on the algorithm that assessed street camera 
footage would be considered a clear violation of the privacy of people 
who drive company cars.200 Hence, the value of the privacy right 
changes based on the class of the individual who is being investigated. 
In addition, the Dutch government is known for the big subsidies that 
it provides to international corporations.201 Thus, the government is 
more willing to turn a blind eye to potentially big fraudulent activities 
while it spends significant resources on expensive systems like SyRI for 
minimal returns.  
In summary, the sociopolitical context significantly impacts the 
types of algorithms that are adopted, how they work, and who they 
target. The attempts to magnify the scale of welfare fraud in order to 
gather more support for automation and further polarize society is 
especially troubling. These issues must be taken into account before 
deciding to automate a certain domain. It is evident that the money 
spent on poorly designed algorithms such as MiDAS and SyRI would be 
better used on improving welfare services and easing the application 
process either algorithmically or otherwise. Still, fighting welfare fraud 
is a legitimate governmental goal and using cutting-edge technology to 
do so is valid; this was recognized even by the SyRI court.202 Hence, the 
discussion in the next Parts centers on how to fulfill this goal with 
proper safeguards in place. More specifically, it will address how to fight 
welfare fraud while ensuring that street-level bureaucrats can 
intervene when needed.  
V. AFTER THE AUTOMATION, IS THERE SUFFICIENT ROOM FOR  
STREET-LEVEL BUREAUCRATS TO APPLY THEIR DISCRETION? 
This Part deals with the first question related to modeling 
discretion: whether there is still sufficient room for street-level 
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bureaucrats to apply discretion after implementing the algorithm. The 
answer to this question will be divided into two Sections. The first 
Section analyzes what exactly the algorithm automates, defined as how 
broad the automated domain is and which parts of the decision-making 
process are automated. The second Section discusses how much 
discretionary power is shifted to the algorithm itself or to the engineers 
developing it. After determining whether any room for discretion is left, 
the following Part analyzes whether the discretion is meaningful.  
A. What Exactly Does the Algorithm Automate? 
1. Large-Scale Bureaucracy Versus System-Level Bureaucracy 
Understanding the domain that an algorithm has automated 
and how broad it is requires understanding the different ways in which 
MiDAS and SyRI operate. The move from screen-level bureaucracy to 
system-level bureaucracy was previously discussed, but as automation 
technology advances, more links between different system-level 
bureaucracies are established and large-scale bureaucracies are 
created.203 There is no conclusive evidence in the literature answering 
the question of which type of bureaucracy is more favorable. Both 
system-level bureaucracies and large-scale bureaucracies have pros and 
cons that impact their efficiency as well as the work of the street-level 
bureaucrats. 
On the one hand, in large scale bureaucracies, data is often 
shared between systems, and without further verification, it is 
combined to reach a certain decision that can cause many errors and 
chain reactions. The idea is that the very large size of the large-scale 
bureaucracies poses a risk from the governance perspective: they are 
very hard to manage, their maintenance is very costly, and it is hard to 
quickly adapt them to the rapid changes in policy.204 In fact, the size of 
the automated bureaucracy is considered a significant reason for the 
failure of e-government projects.205 Large-scale bureaucracies are very 
organizationally complex, and they lack the flexibility of system-level 
bureaucracies that could be adapted more easily to the needs of 
automation.206 From the organizational perspective, large-scale 
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bureaucracies implemented in big governmental organizations are 
complex because decision-making is divided between many 
stakeholders with different political motives and goals.207 The high level 
of technical expertise needed for deploying large-scale bureaucracies 
requires governments to move from “organizational capacity to 
organized expertise,” and good technical knowledge has never been a 
strength of governmental organizations.208 Large-scale bureaucracies 
are also characterized with lack of coordination between the macro 
implementation and the micro-level day-to-day work. There is a 
significant focus on the technicalities of the system without paying 
much attention to the interaction of the worker with the technology and 
how the technology is being used to achieve the task.209  
On the other hand, large-scale bureaucracies have more capacity 
to lead change. They are often implemented in large organizations that 
would have more financial and organizational capabilities to support 
change, especially when compared with system-level bureaucracies  
that are often implemented in smaller organizations.210 Large-scale 
bureaucracies also have unique advantages, such as enabling 
information sharing and collaboration between different entities within 
the government and outside of it. These collaborations can help entities 
provide better services, avoiding redundancy of information, reducing 
costs, improving accountability, and tackling complex problems.211 
In terms of discretion, if implemented correctly and not just for 
the sole purpose of increasing efficiency, both types of bureaucracy 
could potentially improve discretionary street-level bureaucracy. 
System-level bureaucracy could “free” street-level bureaucrats from the 
repetitive administrative tasks and dedicate more time for frontline 
customer service and support. If large-scale bureaucracy is transparent 
and explainable, it could help street-level bureaucrats understand why 
a certain decision about an individual was taken and communicate it to 
the individual. Street-level bureaucrats would have access to more data 
and decisions taken by other agencies because of the links between the 
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systems, so they could also explain the situation better to their 
customers.212 It should be emphasized that as mentioned, this will only 
be possible if governmental agencies realize the potential of automation 
to improve customer services. This would require keeping caseworkers 
at their jobs, not distancing them from individuals who need their help 
by putting walls of technology between the two.213  
MiDAS can be defined as a system-level bureaucracy because it 
automated a relatively narrow domain—fraud in unemployment 
benefits. Thus, if the factors that the algorithm considered were 
publicly available, it would have been possible to understand and, if 
necessary, to argue whether the connections that the algorithm made 
between the specific factors and unemployment fraud were right or 
wrong. 
In contrast, SyRI automated a broader domain—all types of 
fraud in welfare benefits—which makes it a large-scale bureaucracy. 
Because little is known about this type of bureaucracy, a parliamentary 
inquiry was launched to investigate the deployment of IT in 
governmental services. The inquiry criticized the complexity of  
large-scale projects because they are composed of a chain of systems, 
making it difficult to track down problems that arose from the system, 
understand their sources, and solve them.214 Thus, the legislators 
recommended minimizing the use of large-scale bureaucracies in the 
Netherlands.215 However, this would reduce the benefits of interagency 
collaboration. Despite the aforementioned failures, the municipalities 
that adopted SyRI emphasized in their final reports that they benefited 
immensely from the collaboration between the different entities, 
including those outside of the core mission of the project, because  
the participants in the project developed a network and gained 
understanding of each member’s expertise, thus allowing them to better 
care for their citizens.216 
It is also worth mentioning that, in the past, SyRI used to 
operate as an ordinary system-level bureaucracy, but the outcome was 
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not necessarily better. SyRI is actually the third version of an algorithm 
that has been used by the government since 2003.217 The first version 
of the algorithm was Project Waterproof, in which the government 
linked data about the water usage of individuals and data about  
welfare benefits in order to find potential fraudulent activities by 
comparing the reported number of inhabitants living in a unit versus 
what was happening in practice.218 The second version of the  
algorithm was called Black Box, which consisted of three types of 
projects: phenomenon-driven projects (projects that attempted to crack 
down on a specific phenomenon, such as residential fraud or asset 
fraud); business-oriented projects (projects that attempted to crack 
down on the types of sectors known to be violating labor laws,  
such as the hotel industry, catering, and cleaning services); and  
neighborhood-oriented projects (projects that analyzed certain 
neighborhoods and attempted to provide social support, combat crime, 
and detect fraud).219 After legal changes, Black Box became SyRI, which 
adopted the neighborhood-oriented approach and abandoned the other 
two types of projects.220 It should be mentioned that Waterproof and 
Black Box both had significant flaws, so it is hard to conclude that a 
system-level bureaucracy was necessarily better than a large-scale 
bureaucracy. Their flaws can partially be attributed to faulty data 
anonymization, legal hurdles, and poor technical design, so it is difficult 
to predict whether a system-level bureaucracy would have been more 
successful in the absence of these hurdles. Nevertheless, it would be 
beneficial to consider the issue of scale when designing the next phase 
of SyRI and assessing the costs and benefits of the two types of systems.  
Some researchers recommend staying away from large-scale 
bureaucracies and focusing on ad hoc system-level bureaucracies.221 
System-level bureaucracies are easier to implement overall, especially 
in government, and it is easier to track their performance and avoid 
errors, thus they should be favored when possible, but this conclusion 
cannot be absolute.222 Determining which type of system to adopt would 
depend on many factors including the goal that the automation aims to 
achieve, the potential added value of collaborations between agencies, 
and the possible risks that might arise because of the link between 
systems. The governmental entity considering such deployment should 
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assess the impact of each type of system and the feasibility of achieving 
the goals of the project using a system-level bureaucracy.  
2. Decision-Making Versus Decision-Aiding Algorithms 
In addition to determining an algorithm’s domain, 
understanding the decision-making process that it automates is key. 
The difference between decision-making algorithms and decision-aiding 
algorithms is the finality of the algorithm’s determination and the level 
of human involvement. Decision-making algorithms automatically 
issue a coercive decision based mainly on links between data without 
any human input.223 The decision, which is usually final, results in a 
significant impact on applicants, such as the termination of benefits.224 
Decision-aiding algorithms, on the other hand, attempt to help the 
relevant individual make his or her final decision.225 The underlying 
software often provides recommendations based on the analyzed 
data.226 The higher degree of human intervention makes this type of 
algorithm less risky than decision-making algorithms.227  
MiDAS and SyRI are very different in terms of their  
decision-making capabilities and are in fact on opposite ends of the 
spectrum. MiDAS is a full-on decision-making algorithm: it automates 
all processes from beginning to end, including data collection, analysis, 
fraud determination, and debt collection.228 SyRI only automates  
data collection and analysis, with street-level bureaucrats from 
relevant agencies completing the investigations and making final 
determinations.229 Thus, it is clearly a decision-aiding algorithm. As 
mentioned previously, eliminating discretion in welfare distribution is 
impossible because even clear and specific rules will not be able to 
capture the complexities of each individual case.230 In other words, 
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human discretion will always have to be part of the equation; 
governments must draw the boundaries of discretion because they 
cannot eradicate it.231 Therefore, any changes to MiDAS should include 
giving more responsibilities to street-level bureaucrats and making 
sure that it becomes a decision-aiding algorithm.  
3. Automating Rules Versus Automating Standards 
In governing a certain domain, legislators and policy makers 
have to determine the optimal specificity of law that on the one hand 
would provide certainty and precision for individuals, lawyers, and 
judges, and on the other hand would leave room for flexibility to deal 
with conflicts and ambiguities that could arise.232 In other words, they 
should choose between legal rules and standards. Overall, rules are 
more “expensive” to deploy because of the need to foresee and detail all 
possible scenarios and determine their outcome, but they are easier for 
individuals to follow. Standards are more suitable for areas of law that 
change frequently, such as technology, because rules would need to be 
adjusted often, a hard task to achieve.233 The debate between rules and 
standards is known as the Hart and Dworkin debate. According to 
Dworkin’s theory, “[r]ules are applicable in an all-or-nothing fashion,” 
in the sense that when “two rules conflict, one of them cannot be a valid 
rule.”234 Principles on the other hand are more flexible, they can 
intersect and overlap, and when resolving a conflict the judge can take 
both into account and weigh them accordingly.235 Hart perceives rules 
in a broader sense, “a legal rule is a standard that has been identified 
and selected as binding by some social act, be it an individual directive, 
a legislative enactment, a judicial decision, an administrative ruling, or 
a social custom.”236 Thus, they can all be taken into account in resolving 
an argument.  
Applying this debate to the realm of automation, on one end of 
the spectrum, there are researchers who are strong believers in the 
ability of technology to transform the law to a rule-based system in a 
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Dworkinian sense; the technology would help foresee all possible 
conflicts and outcomes, thus rules can be created in advance, applied 
when needed, and the rules would not conflict because the outcome has 
been pre-predicted.237 The algorithm will be trained using the law, other 
related regulation, and the reach set of case law that accompany 
them.238 On the other end of the spectrum, opponents of automation 
claim that it is too difficult to foresee all the legal combinations of a 
given set of rules and facts, let alone translate them into lines of code 
that a computer can understand.239  
In practice, both legal rules and standards are prone to multiple 
interpretations, courts often have to apply broad standards such as 
reasonableness and proportionality to solve a conflict between different 
rules or rules and standards. The language of the text alone cannot 
always determine the solution to every future case.240 Therefore, the 
debate among researchers centers on the type of cases that can be 
automated and cases where human input is crucial. The most common 
distinction in this regard is between cases that grant the judge or policy 
maker weak or strong discretion. According to Dworkin, judges and 
policy makers can only use weak discretion, where it is necessary to 
bridge between principles.241 According to Hart, using strong discretion 
is inevitable because of natural ambiguities between rules, so no matter 
how thorough the guidance provided is, questions that require deep 
intervention will remain open and judges and policy makers will need 
to use strong discretion to resolve them.242 In terms of automation, 
strong discretion cannot be automated because by design the regulator 
meant to keep the decision in the hands of the administrator.243 Cases 
that limit the discretion of the administrator to a narrow set of 
alternatives are weak discretion cases, and they could be considered for 
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automation.244 Nevertheless, both Hart and Dwirkin seem to agree that 
discretion is necessary to resolve situations where rules are conflicting 
or where rules and standards are at stake. The argument is centered on 
the degree of discretion and its origin. While according to Hart judges 
use their strong discretion because social guidance is central to 
determining the content of legal rules, according to Dworkin judges are 
bound by the principle that their origin is political morality.245 Even if 
the legitimacy to use discretion comes from social guidance or political 
morality, in the process of automation it is important to acknowledge 
that room for discretion to weigh in should be kept, and even in weak 
discretion cases Dworkin acknowledges that seeking the ultimate 
answer is a hard task for a judge, let alone for an algorithm.  
As mentioned above, MiDAS automated a narrow  
domain—unemployment benefit fraud—but it automated all the tasks 
that were previously conducted by street-level bureaucrats.246 MiDAS 
could be considered as automating rules since the law theoretically 
defined the actions constituting unemployment fraud very clearly. 
However, examining the regulation as well as the relevant case law 
reveals a more complicated picture. According to instructions provided 
by the US Department of Labor (DOL), “fraud determinations generally 
‘require the state agency to make determinations of credibility and 
intent.’”247 In addition, according to Michigan’s Court Rules Section 
2.112(b)(1), “the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake must be 
stated with particularity” when alleging fraud or mistake.248 The courts 
interpreted this requirement to include a “heightened pleading 
standard” which means that fraud “is not to be presumed lightly, but 
must be clearly proved” with satisfactory and convincing evidence.249 To 
meet this enhanced burden, fraud allegations typically include facts 
showing the time, place, contents of the misrepresentation, and 
 
 244. Ruth Kannai, Uri Schild & John Zeleznikow, Modeling the Evolution of Legal  
Discretion. An Artificial Intelligence Approach, 20 RATIO JURIS 530, 534–35 (2007).  
 245. Shapiro, supra note 236, at 17–19. 
 246. See Paul Egan, After MiDAS Fiasco, Unemployment Fraud Bills Getting Speedy  
Passage, DETROIT FREE PRESS (Dec. 1, 2017, 6:00 AM), https://eu.freep.com/story/news/local/mich-
igan/2017/12/01/after-midas-false-fraud-fiasco-jobless-reform-bills-getting-speedy-passage-michi-
gan-unemployment/908315001/ [https://perma.cc/W53P-P5TK]. 
 247. U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., ATTACHMENT TO UIPL NO. 01-16, FEDERAL REQUIREMENTS TO 
PROTECT CLAIMANT RIGHTS IN STATE UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION OVERPAYMENT 
PREVENTION AND RECOVERY PROCEDURES - QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 4 (2015), 
https://wdr.doleta.gov/directives/attach/UIPL/UIPL_01-16-Change-1-Attachment_Acc.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/Z9K5-24KZ].  
 248. MICH. CT. R. 2.112(B)(1). 
 249. Cooper v. Auto Club Ins. Ass’n, 751 N.W.2d 443, 451 (Mich. 2008); see State ex rel. 
Gurganus v. CVS Caremark Corp., 852 N.W.2d 103, 112 (Mich. 2014). 
492 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.  [Vol. 23:3:451 
identification of what was obtained.250 If designed correctly, an 
algorithm should be able to identify the factual basis, but particularity, 
credibility, and intent are not easy terms to compute and applying  
them to each case requires the involvement of street-level 
bureaucrats—agents who were fired after the deployment of MiDAS. 
Since details of the operation of MiDAS have not been revealed for 
proprietary reasons, it is hard to understand how particularity, 
credibility, and intent were translated into MiDAS.  
SyRI was a decision-aiding large-scale bureaucracy. In contrast 
to MiDAS, SyRI automated a relatively broad domain—fraud in all 
types of welfare benefits—but a narrower set of tasks: data collection 
and analysis for fraud investigations.251 Because large-scale 
bureaucracies by definition combine different systems, they do not deal 
exclusively with rules or standards. Thus, tying the algorithm to a 
specific definition of fraud is impossible because every fraud violation 
requires proving different legal elements that are not always internally 
consistent. In any case, determining if a certain activity constitutes 
fraud would certainly involve issues of morality and contradicting rules 
and standards, so discretion is inevitable. In addition, SyRI dictated to 
the street-level bureaucrats which cases to examine and which to leave 
out.252 Therefore, it was important to ensure that the flagged cases were 
the high-risk cases and to minimize false positives, a rate that was very 
high in SyRI. In addition, human officials intervened only after SyRI 
decided to place an individual under government surveillance, which 
can last up to two years.253 This is far too late to remedy SyRI’s  
false positives, as some evidence for wrongdoing will inevitably be found 
after two years of surveillance. Instead, the new version of SyRI  
must include human intervention prior to deciding whether to surveil  
an individual and for how long. This ensures that SyRI only  
automates the rule: whether the facts constitute potential fraud. The  
standard—whether fraud was committed and whether to open an 
investigation—will be left to human decision makers.  
B. The Discretionary Power Delegated to the Engineers and the 
Technology 
Besides asking whether automation has left room for street-level 
bureaucrats to apply their discretion, it is important to ask how much 
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discretionary power has shifted to the engineers who built the 
technology or to the technology itself. As mentioned in Section II.B, this 
has become a significant issue after the wide expansion of automation 
in general, and AI and machine learning in particular, although it  
is hard to detect.254 Often the IT engineers and data analysts  
lack sufficient knowledge and nuanced understanding of policy 
considerations, which can lead to them approaching the automation 
process with misguided assumptions about what tasks to automate and 
how. The automation process requires interpreting complex sets of laws 
and regulations that are not meant to be conclusive and deciding how 
to code them. Thus, software engineers and data analysts could end up 
explicitly or implicitly converting legal rules into binding algorithms.255 
Even the way information is organized and displayed in the algorithm 
reflects a discretionary choice, which, if not specified by the government 
agency, will be dictated by the developer.256  
The life cycle of an algorithm can be divided into four stages  
as described below, and each one involves important discretionary 
decisions.257  
1. Planning 
In the planning stage, the developers learn the policies that 
should be embedded in the algorithm and the desired outcomes in order 
to decide what is the most suitable type of algorithm. The IT manager’s 
first discretionary decision might be which technique to use,  
such as traditional statistical techniques versus more advanced  
machine-learning and AI tools.258 One important difference is that more 
traditional statistical techniques tend to explain the relationship 
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between a certain variable and the final outcome in greater detail.259 
On the contrary, the underlying goal of machine learning is enhanced 
prediction and minimizing the model’s error rate.260 The developers 
examine the accuracy rate under different types of algorithms, 
anticipate the types of cases that are likely to result in erroneous 
outcomes, and predict the differences to be expected when moving from 
the testing to the performance phase.261  
2. Data Engineering 
In this stage, the developers collect the data for training the 
algorithm. However, the choice of data set, which is what the algorithm 
is built on, significantly impacts its performance. The process of 
deciding what data to include or exclude from the data set is often 
unclear and rarely documented.262 The data may contain explicit and 
implicit biases and may be either under- or overinclusive. While the 
developer might be in favor of including as much data as possible, this 
is not necessarily desirable from a policy perspective because of 
potential privacy bridges and other issues.263 
3. Modeling 
This is the stage where the developers put all the aggregated 
knowledge that they gathered about the policy and the system into 
practice and design the algorithm. The developers have to define the 
logical sequence for putting all the pieces of the puzzle together. This 
task often includes taking the problem that the algorithm intends to 
solve and breaking it into small tasks that each segment of the 
algorithm is responsible for.264 Very important discretionary decisions 
are taken in this stage, such as defining what constitutes a discrepancy, 
deciding what factors will be considered by the algorithm and their 
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relative weight, and defining the possible outcomes. If not tuned 
correctly, the algorithm learns how to maximize its decision-making 
performance at all costs, even if this means excluding certain 
populations.265  
4. Testing and Maintenance 
A machine-learning algorithm, which constantly learns and 
produces outputs that determine significant aspects of people’s lives, 
has to be regularly tested and maintained. Auditing should continue 
both during the algorithm’s development and afterward to ensure 
alignment with the policies it is meant to enforce.266  
It is important to mention that the different stages in the life 
cycle of the algorithm are often inseparable and operate consecutively. 
Thus, planning is not over after the developer has some idea about the 
policy and the needed change, and data engineering should always be 
updated in light of the testing and maintenance processes. 
C. Application to MiDAS and SyRI 
Determining the proportion of discretionary power that is 
shifted to the engineers or the technology is perhaps the hardest 
challenge in these case studies. Both the UIA in Michigan and the 
Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment in the Netherlands fought 
hard in courts not to reveal their algorithms. In Michigan, the cases are 
still in the discovery phase, and thus far the plaintiffs have not been 
able to obtain access to the code or to publicly reveal any significant 
information about the operation of the algorithm.267 As for SyRI, the 
court’s final judgement recognized the fact that the state refused to 
reveal the algorithm.268 However, revealing the whole code to the public 
is not the only way to learn about the development process. Many 
algorithms that operate in sensitive, public-sector domains have 
manuals that are easily accessible, and sometimes even technical 
documents with details about error rates are available.269 Another 
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solution would be to strengthen the procurement rules and to require 
certain guarantees, such as technical accountability and sufficient 
disclosures of the vendor’s intended development process.270 The fact 
that MiDAS delegated an unknown amount of discretion to the 
algorithms and their engineers while providing so little information 
about their inner workings proves that the issue was not given enough 
attention. 
1. The Development of MiDAS 
a. Planning 
Fast Enterprises, LLC is known to have been selected through a 
competitive process, and representatives from the UIA and the 
Department of Technology, Management, and Budget oversaw the 
production and implementation of MiDAS.271 Why the Gentax product 
was selected, what other types of algorithms were considered, what the 
degree of collaboration between the government and the developers 
was, and the extent of actual caseworker involvement are all unknown. 
b. Data Engineering 
MiDAS analyzes data coming from the claimants, employers, 
and other participating agencies, such as the Department of Health and 
Human Services.272 Information is lacking about the types of data that 
are analyzed and what other agencies are participating. In addition, it 
is not clear how the data was tested, what the results of the testing 
were, and whether the data was modified at all before testing. 
c. Modeling 
UIA identified 1,558 functional requirements and 6,979 
business rules to be incorporated in the system.273 In addition, a guide 
provided by the UIA has revealed that “MiDAS has the ability to look 
at fact-finding responses and come up with legally appropriate 
 
assessment tools used in the criminal justice system and showing that many tools come with a 
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decisions automatically.”274 Although revealing all the rules might be 
unnecessary and even open the door to exploitation, crucial information 
about the factors that the algorithm takes into account and how it 
operates is nevertheless missing. Before MiDAS, four hundred 
employees were conducting interviews and making determinations;275 
it is unknown how the algorithm replicates this process, assuming it 
even tried to do so, who was responsible for coding its logic, and what 
error rate the developers found acceptable.  
d. Testing and Maintenance 
Despite being forced to fix all the errors caused by MiDAS, 
Michigan renewed the contract with MiDAS’s developers and several 
laws were passed in 2015 and 2017 in order to avoid similar errors in 
the future.276 However, the laws mainly addressed procedural fixes that 
were not directly related to the technology itself, such as making sure 
that the notice was sent to the correct address.277 It is not clear whether 
MiDAS’s error rates are still monitored and when, if ever, it will be 
validated again.  
2. The Development of SyRI 
Because SyRI was developed internally by the government, the 
risk that private interests interfered with its development is less 
substantial, so there are fewer potential pitfalls to address. However, 
information about many aspects related to the development of the 
algorithm is lacking, which is especially troubling since there are no 
third-party interests in confidentiality like in the case of MiDAS. The 
IB, the special entity created to coordinate the SyRI project and the 
collaboration between the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment 
and the municipalities, is responsible for the operation of SyRI.278 Yet, 
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it is not clear to what extent the IB was involved in the technical 
development of SyRI and what ability it had to impact the design.  
a. Planning 
The court judgment starts by discussing the machine-learning 
technique used and whether SyRI is based on deep-learning or  
self-learning methods.279 The plaintiffs argued that SyRI was based on 
a deep-learning or self-learning technique because the algorithm freely 
investigated discrepancies on a large scale with no human guidance and 
without identifying what the discrepancy meant, and the public officers 
receiving the analysis could not tell why SyRI concluded that there was 
a discrepancy.280 The state argued that SyRI only compared data within 
designated governmental agencies for each project that was planned, 
and the comparison itself was a simple decision tree.281 Thus, SyRI was 
not a self-learning or deep-learning algorithm because it was only 
programmed to find factual discrepancies.282 The court concluded that 
some projects involved large-scale data collection, so given what was 
known about SyRI’s operation and the fact that SyRI’s implementing 
legislation allowed it to adapt based on its internal learning, it was 
possible that predictive analysis and deep learning were involved.283 
However, it is not clear if this ruling implies that deep learning is 
problematic by default. If appropriately designed, deep learning can 
help the human in the loop identify patterns and reveal issues that were 
under explored before.284  
b. Data Engineering 
As mentioned before, SyRI processes seventeen types of data and 
some are relevant for identifying welfare fraud, such as employment 
and accommodation.285 However, the court and other governmental 
entities criticized the fact that not all of the data types were relevant, 
particularly health records and police data which are considered a 
special category of data according to the GDPR and require special 
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protection.286 It is not clear what their contribution is to welfare fraud 
detection. 
c. Modeling 
During the hearing, the Ministry was criticized for not revealing 
much information about the system, which was especially suspicious 
since even the intelligence services in the Netherlands are required to 
reveal more details about the technology that they are using.287 
However, the court was not clear about what information should have 
been revealed, in other words, if the Ministry needed to expose the 
whole code or publish a detailed manual. 
d. Testing and Maintenance 
The Ministry did not demonstrate any attempts to deal with the 
false positives identified by SyRI.288 However, the fact that SyRI was 
not delivering accurate predictions was one of the reasons the Ministry 
decided to develop a second version of SyRI instead of appealing the 
court’s decision.289 
As the cases of MiDAS and SyRI demonstrate, it is hard to 
determine how much discretion is shifted to the engineers and the 
technology itself with so little information about the design and 
operation of these algorithms. One thing is clear, however: the power of 
the software engineers and data analysts has increased since  
system-level bureaucracies were introduced and human discretion has 
been reduced. As more caseworkers are replaced with engineers, the 
focus shifts to technological improvements to the algorithm, 
implementing new links between different components, and 
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VI. AFTER THE AUTOMATION, IS THE DISCRETION LEFT IN THE HANDS 
OF STREET-LEVEL BUREAUCRATS MEANINGFUL? 
The discretion given to street-level bureaucrats has clearly been 
reduced by automation, but it has not vanished completely. This is 
easier to see in SyRI’s case, but even in MiDAS’s case, where the 
reduction was more severe, the public backlash led to a legislative 
amendment requiring UIA officials to review cases before a fraud 
determination.291 Thus, having sufficient room for discretion is an 
important aspect but not the only one. The discretion of street-level 
bureaucrats should also be meaningful; this is in order to bridge 
between the general requirements of the law and the facts of  individual 
cases and close narrow gaps in the law. This Part will examine what 
would make discretion meaningful in two components: (1) the impact of 
street-level bureaucrats on individual welfare decisions and (2) the 
impact of street-level bureaucrats on external policy considerations, 
such as privacy, transparency, and accountability. 
A. The Human-Algorithm Interaction: Impact on Individual Welfare 
Decisions  
Street-level bureaucrats cannot be forced to rubber-stamp the 
algorithm’s decisions. Rather, they should be given the necessary tools 
and knowledge for assessing the algorithmic output and challenging it 
if needed. There are four aspects related to the algorithmic design and 
the structure of the bureaucratic system that should be taken into 
account in determining whether discretion is meaningful.  
First is the finality of the decision, what is the algorithmic 
outcome and how are street-level bureaucrats expected to act upon it. 
Part V argued that if the algorithm is a decision-making algorithm, 
there will be no room for street-level bureaucrats to apply their 
discretion. However, even if the algorithm is a decision-aiding 
algorithm, the decisiveness of the outcome will determine how 
meaningful the discretion is. If the outcome of the algorithm is just a 
binary “fraudulent” or “nonfraudulent,” the street-level bureaucrats 
have little meaningful discretion. Thus, it is more likely that they will 
blindly follow the recommendation of the algorithm.292 Alternatively, 
the algorithm can be instructed to rank each applicant on a risk scale, 
such as from most to least likely to be eligible for benefits, along with a 
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confidence scale, such as from most to least certain regarding 
eligibility.293 The scale of five eligibility levels could ensure meaningful 
human intervention, and ineligibility will not be the default outcome.294 
The street-level bureaucrats would be able to use their discretionary 
power and distinguish between nuances that characterize each 
category.295  
The next consideration is how each street-level bureaucrat’s 
caseload has been affected along with how much time they are given to 
review cases post-automation. Although cases differ in their complexity, 
thus making it hard to predict how much time will be needed for any 
given case, many metrics are available for tracking the performance of 
street-level bureaucrats, and, in fact, this was one of the goals in moving 
from the traditional to the new public management approach.296 Thus, 
comparing the number of cases handled before and after automation 
could give a hint as to how discretion is applied and if it is meaningful. 
It is highly likely that the number of cases that each street-level 
bureaucrat will deal with will increase after the automation because of 
time saved on data collection and analysis. But if the increase is so great 
that the street-level bureaucrats do not have enough time to closely 
examine each case, the discretion will not be meaningful.  
The third aspect is the readiness of the institution for the 
automation. Ensuring that the public, the officers, and the institution 
benefit from the automation is an expensive process that entails 
planning, training, supervision, and rearranging roles within the 
organization. Without taking care of those tasks, it would be hard to 
ensure that the discretion remaining in the hands of the street-level 
bureaucrats is meaningful.  
The fourth element, the involvement of the street-level 
bureaucrats in the automation process, is critical. The more involved 
street-level bureaucrats are, the better the implementation will be. 
Street-level bureaucrats know the relevant administrative processes 
better than anyone else and will be able to indicate which parts of the 
process will most likely benefit from automation. This is particularly 
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important when trying to automate welfare-related tasks where the 
one-on-one interaction with the claimants has a unique added value.297 
Without input from street-level bureaucrats, developers would lack 
contextual knowledge that is important to the smooth operation of the 
algorithm. In addition, when street-level bureaucrats are not involved 
in the process, they are often reluctant to accept the technology because 
they see it as a threat to their profession.298  
1. MiDAS 
Michigan Code of Legislation Section 421.32a(1) states, in 
relevant part, that “the unemployment agency shall in its discretion 
issue a redetermination affirming, modifying, or reversing the prior 
determination and stating the reasons for the redetermination.”299 
After the MiDAS scandal broke and news of several innocent job seekers 
who were falsely flagged by MiDAS permeated the media, there was 
strong pressure on the legislature to end its reliance on MiDAS as the 
only determining mechanism.300 The efforts yielded fruit, and as of now, 
the UIA: 
shall not make a determination that a claimant made an intentional false statement, 
misrepresentation, or concealment of material information that is subject to 
sanctions under this section based solely on a computer-identified discrepancy in 
information supplied by the claimant or employer. An unemployment agency 
employee or agent must examine the facts and independently determine that the 
claimant or the employer is responsible for a willful or intentional violation before 
the agency makes a determination under this section.301  
The requirement to keep fraud determination in the hands of 
human agents goes beyond the Michigan legislature. A directive issued 
by the DOL to all unemployment agencies asserts that states are 
required by federal law to independently verify computer-identified 
fraud cases.302 In addition, the directive repeats and strengthens  
the requirements of the Computer Matching and Privacy Protection  
Act to “independently verify information received from a computer  
cross-match with a Federal database or other automatic processes or 
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matches before suspending, terminating, reducing, or making a final 
denial of unemployment compensation.”303  
Although not federal law, the DOL’s guidelines and local 
Michigan laws highlight the importance of keeping the final 
determination of fraud in the hands of a human agent, it is not clear if 
MiDAS is satisfying that. The room for intervention that is left for 
street-level bureaucrats remains less meaningful since MiDAS still just 
outputs a yes or no answer. It is not clear how many street-level 
bureaucrats are reviewing how many cases and what exactly the review 
entails, nor is it clear whether street-level bureaucrats were involved in 
the automation process. UIA mostly adopted minor changes after the 
fiasco, including the following: focusing on improving customer services, 
working with community groups, and clarifying the letters sent to 
claimants.304 UIA completed a review of all false allegations MiDAS 
made between 2013 and 2015 and made efforts to improve the process 
of identification and verification of information.305 On the 
organizational front, the UIA established an investigations division 
that would improve policy, monitor performance, and enhance 
technological support.306 Although those changes are beneficial, more 
has to be done to ensure meaningful discretion and guarantee that 
wages will not be garnished and tax returns will not be seized for minor 
input errors.  
2. SyRI 
In the Netherlands, as in all EU countries, the prohibition on 
relying solely on automated decision-making is anchored in Article 22 
of the GDPR, which states the following: “The data subject shall have 
the right not to be subject to a decision based solely on automated 
processing, including profiling, which produces legal effects concerning 
him or her or similarly significantly affects him or her.”307 Thus, three 
questions have to be examined: whether SyRI is profiling individuals; 
whether the decision will have or potentially have a “legal effect” on the 
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individual; and whether the decision is truly “solely automated,” which 
is to say whether the human intervention is meaningful. It was 
undisputed between the parties that the links that SyRI created 
between files constituted profiling as it is defined by Article 4 of the 
GDPR.308 However, the latter two questions required more analysis. 
In terms of legal effects, the District Court of The Hague 
concluded that the deployment of SyRI did not have a legal consequence 
on the individual, yet it did have a significant effect on the private life 
of the person to whom the report related because it could be stored  
for up to two years and could be passed on to other agencies such as  
the police and used along with other evidence as the bases for 
enforcement.309  
The court then discussed whether the human intervention as 
outlined in SyRI is meaningful or whether the decision that SyRI 
generates is “solely automated” as defined by the GDPR.310 The state 
claimed that the decision-making was not solely automated because 
there were two human safeguards in the process: the agents in the IB 
who checked for false positives, and the agents at the relevant agency 
who would make an independent assessment of whether a risk report 
raised serious claims worth further investigation.311 The plaintiffs 
claimed that the former was not a sufficient human intervention 
because removing false positives, practically speaking, only means 
removing incorrect evidence.312 As for the latter, the intervention by the 
relevant agents could not be considered meaningful since the agent had 
no way of understanding exactly how the risk report was generated and 
what combination of information led to the final determination.313 In 
addition, the individual who was the subject of the report could not 
provide additional information or object to anything written in it before 
the decision is taken.314  
Ultimately, the court did not determine whether the human 
intervention was meaningful as classified by Article 22.315 However, 
considering the factors discussed earlier, street-level bureaucrats 
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working with SyRI had significant room to apply their discretion, and 
it may well have been meaningful. First, SyRI only automated data 
collection and analysis, with human agents required to investigate 
further before making the final determination.316 Second, a special 
agency was tasked with coordinating between the Ministry and the 
municipalities.317 And finally, although the impacts on caseworker 
workloads are unknown, no one was laid off post-automation.318 
However, as with MiDAS, SyRI’s algorithmic output is a yes-or-no 
determination that leaves less room for discretion.319 Changing to the 
scale system discussed above could help direct the street-level 
bureaucrats in their decision-making and might also encourage them to 
investigate more before applying their discretionary power. 
The degree to which street-level bureaucrats were involved in 
the development of SyRI is not known. However, SyRI was a national 
project, its development was overseen by high-level Ministry officials, 
and its deployment was very decentralized in local municipalities.320 In 
the period in which SyRI was operational, collaborations between 
workers from different agencies were reported at the project level but 
not in the algorithmic-design stage.321  
Interestingly, street-level bureaucrats were incorporated into 
the development of a welfare fraud-detection algorithm deployed 
elsewhere in the Netherlands. Lekstroom, Nissewaard, and several 
other municipalities implemented a fraud-detection algorithm 
developed by a private company named Totta Data Lab.322 The 
algorithm operated similarly to SyRI but was exposed to less data.323 
There is a technical document that sheds some light on the algorithm’s 
operation, and the code has been revealed to three ministries: the 
Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment, the Ministry of the Interior, 
and the Ministry of Justice and Security.324 Early empirical findings 
reveal that since the development of the algorithm was more local, 
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street-level bureaucrats who conducted those investigations were 
closely involved in the process, leading to better consideration of local 
needs and incorporation of more knowledge about the local community 
in which the algorithm was operating.325 
Training an algorithm on data coming from the population that 
it will be examining and incorporating local knowledge are important 
factors in the development of any system. In addition, if local  
street-level bureaucrats are more involved in the development they will 
be more inclined to incorporate it into their daily work. However, a 
national system has the advantage of better coordination and 
accountability. Because SyRI was a national project, it had the potential 
to impact all citizens of the Netherlands, which likely played a role in 
why so many civil rights organizations joined forces and challenged the 
algorithm in court. There is no one definitive answer as to whether a 
national implementation is more favorable than a local, decentralized 
system; however, the pros and cons should be considered in designing 
the next phase of SyRI. Regardless, it would still be beneficial for  
the national government to provide guidance on how to develop  
fraud-detection algorithms. And even if the project is developed 
nationally, it is essential to solicit input from local agencies and their 
street-level bureaucrats. All this being said, SyRI clearly allowed room 
for street-level bureaucrats to apply their discretion, and although some 
fixes could be implemented, this discretion was generally meaningful.  
B. Discretion as a Means for Enhancing Other Safeguards  
Keeping street-level bureaucrats engaged and giving them the 
ability to apply meaningful human intervention in individual cases is a 
safeguard against the risks of full automation.326 Humans complement 
the work of the algorithms, applying their creativity to correct 
erroneous assumptions or decisions by the algorithm. Section VI.A 
focused on one aspect of meaningfulness: how to make sure that the 
human in the loop is not a rubber-stamp of the algorithm. Yet 
meaningfulness has a second aspect; discretion is meaningful if it  
helps support other safeguards on automation, and this is the focus of  
this Section. Humans in the loop are one of eight safeguards  
that algorithm-based systems should comply with:327 privacy, 
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accountability, safety and security, transparency and explainability, 
fairness and nondiscrimination, human control of technology, 
professional responsibility, and promotion of human values.328  
All of these safeguards are intended to ensure that automated 
systems are benefiting society as a whole and to guide the use and 
design of AI.329 The implementation of these principles in specific policy 
domains is not an easy task. On the one hand, they are very general 
and open to several interpretations. On the other hand, they sometimes 
oversimplify complex technical questions by providing rigid, concrete 
guidance on how to design algorithms without accounting for the 
uncertainty that those requirements create.330  
1. Implications of the Case Studies 
The lawsuits in both the Michigan and the Netherlands  
cases did not focus on the lack of human discretion because that was 
not the primary issue.331 The focus was on noncompliance with  
other safeguards that are better anchored in the law and grant  
wider protections.332 This Section discusses how discretion—or lack 
thereof—impacts other safeguards.  
a. MiDAS 
In both the state and the federal class action lawsuits, the main 
claim that the plaintiffs rely on is a due process violation.333 As is 
illustrated in this Section, lack of meaningful human intervention 
harms individuals’ right to due process because the role of the human 
is to ensure that the algorithm operates as expected, to guarantee that 
the particular circumstances of each case are fairly considered, and to 
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ensure that each individual is given an opportunity to respond to any 
allegations.  
The right to due process is anchored in the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the US Constitution and in the Michigan 
Constitution.334 The plaintiffs in the federal and state class action 
lawsuits claim that the UIA violated their right to due process by 
relying on MiDAS to detect and adjudicate suspected instances of 
unemployment fraud and by determining guilt without sufficient notice 
or an opportunity to be heard.335 In addition to general due process 
requirements, there are specific clauses in both federal and state  
law that detail the meaning of due process in the context of an 
unemployment fraud investigation. The fraud determination itself  
has to be done by a human, and there are mandatory procedural 
requirements for UIA agents after a determination is made.336 For 
example, UIA agents have to review any case of suspected fraud within 
thirty days and notify the individual about the determination and the 
reason behind it.337 If the agent suspects that the individual committed 
fraud, the agent must verify the current address of the individual with 
the Department of State, the Department of the Treasury, and the US 
Postal Service.338 In addition, there are limitations on the ways to 
collect the debts once fraudulent activity is verified. The individual 
must have the opportunity to present evidence regarding his or her 
ability to pay the debt and the impact of future deductions of benefits 
on the individual’s financial stability.339 These safeguards are meant to 
provide several opportunities for verifying or objecting to the action and 
establish a hierarchy of personnel that will respond to applicant appeals 
and take action if needed. The ongoing court cases over MiDAS 
demonstrate how difficult it is to undo the damage of an erroneous fraud 
determination and the subsequent need for these safeguards, and the 
examples below illustrate this. 
In the state case, lead plaintiff Grant Bauserman had received 
unemployment benefits for approximately five months.340 After the last 
installment of benefits, he received a bonus from his employer for prior 
work that had been deferred until later.341 MiDAS detected the bonus 
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as a discrepancy and seven months after Bauserman stopped receiving 
unemployment benefits he received a request for clarification in his 
online account on the UIA’s website.342 Since Bauserman had no reason 
to check his online account after he stopped receiving money, he only 
became aware of the letter two months later, at which point he 
responded.343 Despite sending several letters and explanations to the 
UIA, he was notified automatically by MiDAS that he had been 
overpaid benefits and that he had to pay a penalty of $15,928.00.344 Four 
months later, Bauserman was notified by the US Department of 
Treasury and the Michigan Department of Treasury that his income tax 
refund had been seized to pay the debt to UIA.345 Three months later, 
the UIA notified Bauserman that the earlier fraud determination was 
“null and void.”346 Similarly, plaintiffs in the federal lawsuits also 
experienced false accusations without sufficient notice. Kristen Mendyk 
received unemployment benefits between 2009 and 2010 and was not 
notified about pending fraud accusations until 2016, which ultimately 
led to her filing for bankruptcy because she was not able to return the 
amount.347 Later on, it was clarified that the accusations were false.348 
Similarly, Michelle Davison was notified about her alleged fraud only 
when the IRS seized her federal and state refunds for 2015 and 2016.349  
Due process, in this case, required giving the plaintiffs a proper 
opportunity to be heard by a UIA agent or a judge with sufficient 
discretion to identify the error and stop the snowball before MiDAS 
could push it downhill. Had MiDAS been designed to include sufficient 
human intervention, many of these mistakes could have been avoided 
entirely.  
b. SyRI 
EU regulations enforce more safeguards regarding 
automation.350 However, SyRI failed to comply with other safeguards 
despite maintaining meaningful human intervenors. The court 
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ultimately banned the use of SyRI because it violated Article 8 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), which protects the 
right to privacy.351 Although the court recognized fighting fraud with 
advanced technology as a legitimate goal, SyRI’s design did not 
sufficiently address potential invasions of privacy.352 Although the 
Secretary for Social Affairs and Employment decided not to appeal the 
final judgment, she mentioned that the department’s focus will be on 
building a new algorithmic system that addresses the concerns raised 
by the court and includes better safeguards for privacy and 
transparency.353 Therefore, it is particularly important to assess how 
humans in the loop can support other safeguards.  
Several scholars criticized the court’s decision to limit its 
analysis of the case only through the lens of ECHR Article 8 and argued 
that each regulatory provision should have been addressed separately 
because analyzing the GDPR and ECHR require different 
frameworks.354 Although both include common provisions such as 
complying with purpose limitations and data minimization, the GDPR 
protects privacy through many specific standards while the ECHR’s 
focus is on legality, legitimate purpose, and a balance of interests.355 By 
mixing the two regulations, the court left out important provisions of 
the GDPR, such as the test of proprietary, storage limitation, and lawful 
processing of personal data.356 Put simply, by conducting a more 
thorough analysis of the GDPR, the court could have assisted the 
Ministry in identifying the changes that needed to be done in the next 
version of SyRI in order to comply with the GDPR. 
If SyRI was analyzed through the lens of the GDPR, it would 
have been subjected to the following seven principles for processing 
data laid out in Article 5 of GDPR: lawfulness, fairness and 
transparency; purpose limitation; data minimization; accuracy; storage 
limitation; integrity and confidentiality; and accountability. Although 
the safeguards that are most connected to discretion are purpose 
limitation, data minimization, and accountability, all seven principles 
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are discussed below with a brief explanation of how they can be used to 
improve SyRI in the next iteration. This Article focuses on the GDPR 
since it is the most recent regulation specifically aimed at advanced 
algorithms like SyRI. These checks and balances do not just cover 
individual administrative decisions, but rather, ultimately shape the 
interactions between citizens, administrators, and agencies.357  
The first safeguards are lawfulness, fairness, and transparency. 
The goal of the first section in Article 5 is to ensure that there is a legal 
ground for the processing of data and that it is being handled in a  
fair and predictable way.358 Furthermore, data must be processed 
transparently, meaning that individuals have a right to know who is 
using their data, for what purpose, and whether they can opt out.359 
SyRI was enacted through legislation in order to avoid legal debates 
over processing data.360 As for fairness and transparency, the court 
concluded that SyRI was not sufficiently transparent or verifiable.361 It 
is critical that subjects are informed about their rights and can act upon 
them, especially because a huge amount of data is processed and it 
comes from many entities. With so little publicly available information 
about SyRI’s operation, welfare recipients had no one to explain their 
rights to them. If caseworkers are told what data the algorithm 
processes and how it operates, they will be able to better notify the data 
subjects and thereby improve data transparency.  
The next safeguard is purpose limitation. This was the main 
principle on which the court relied in declaring SyRI to be unlawful.362 
The principle states that data processing should be for the narrowest 
possible purpose, with specific, explicitly defined goals to be followed 
rigidly.363 Specifically, the processing has to be “necessary in a 
democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or 
the economic well-being of the country.”364 The court concluded that  
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the SyRI legislation did not sufficiently justify the system’s necessity  
in a democratic society.365 The court acknowledged the importance  
of combating welfare fraud, a phenomenon that costs the state 
approximately €500 million.366 Inaction could have led the Dutch people 
to lose confidence in the government and compromise the integrity of 
the economic system and financial institutions.367 Despite these good 
intentions, however, SyRI went too far beyond just combating fraud.368 
Since SyRI and other algorithms control the cases that are seen by 
caseworkers, purpose limitation is a critical safeguard. As mentioned 
before, one change could be to give caseworkers discretion over whether 
to put an individual under surveillance and for how long. In this way, 
humans will ensure that the burden of two years of surveillance will not 
be imposed lightly. After all, automatically surveilling every individual 
that the algorithm flags as suspicious is far from “necessary in a 
democratic society.”  
Another significant criticism leveled at SyRI was its failure to 
minimize the amount of data it collected. Several public officials spoke 
openly against the collection and analysis of health and police data.369 
In addition, the court highlighted that, from the information the state 
provided, the connection between the different data types collected and 
the conclusion of fraud was too unclear.370 While there is a clear link 
between housing data and cohabitation fraud, where people register at 
different addresses when they actually reside in one, the court 
struggled to find other examples.371 Limiting data collection to data 
known to signify increased risk of fraud would allow agents to better 
understand the links and patterns that the algorithm based its 
predictions on and, if necessary, intervene and remedy discriminatory 
or biased links. This limitation is also crucial because welfare 
distribution is so sensitive; denial of benefits can be devastating to an 
individual, thus making accuracy paramount. In the next iteration of 
SyRI, the data being fed into the algorithm must be chosen carefully  
to ensure that the system makes credible inferences. Likewise, 
caseworkers must be able to understand what inferences SyRI will 
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make when presented with certain facts so that they can correct 
mistaken decisions when necessary.  
Accuracy is another key consideration. As previously mentioned, 
the accuracy rate of SyRI was very low. One project established only 
117 cases of fraud out of 119,000 investigations, and benefits were 
terminated in only 10 cases.372 The Minister of Social Affairs and 
Employment later admitted that a major reason the verdict was not 
appealed was that the system was not proven to be accurate.373 It goes 
without saying that having an accurate and reliable system would allow 
a better assessment of the algorithm and its impact on claimants. 
Furthermore, with technological errors taken out of the equation, any 
erroneous decisions can be more accurately traced back to the algorithm 
or the responsible caseworker, thus allowing for proper adjustments to 
be made.  
The SyRI court did not hear arguments about storage limitation 
because this issue is well addressed in the legislation regarding SyRI. 
There are limitations on how long data can be kept. SyRI deletes 
individual data within four weeks if no risk report was generated.374 If 
a risk report was created, the SyRI legislation required that it be 
“retained by the Minister for not longer than deemed necessary for the 
purpose of processing risk reports and for a period of no more than two 
years.”375 Although data storage limitations do not directly impact 
caseworkers or their discretion, they do prevent systems like SyRI from 
unnecessarily holding data on citizens that is no longer needed for 
making a fraud determination, which is key for data privacy concerns. 
The same goes for the ideas of integrity and confidentiality, 
which were likewise not debated by the parties, because as required by 
the GDPR, the IB encrypted the data processed and only decrypted 
some data about high risk individuals later on.376 Again, encryption of 
data does not directly impact caseworkers, but it does ensure that 
individuals do not lose their private information when applying for 
welfare benefits. 
Finally, the issue of accountability is incredibly relevant to the 
issue of discretion. Ensuring that public officials are held accountable 
for their actions is critical for maintaining the public’s trust in the 
system and the government as a whole. Given the long life cycle of an 
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algorithm, different public officials could be responsible for different 
actions. However, it is difficult to hold officials accountable if they 
cannot credibly understand the algorithm’s operation because they will 
not be able to justify its decisions on appeal. Therefore, street-level 
bureaucrats must be able to develop an adequate understanding of the 
algorithm’s operation, such as what data it uses to draw its conclusions 
and why a specific conclusion was reached. By providing this 
information, street-level bureaucrats will be able to properly evaluate 
appeals and appellants will receive more well-reasoned decisions. 
Although several researchers have criticized the safeguards laid 
out in the GDPR as too vague and ambiguous, it is clear that even broad 
safeguards such as fairness and limitation of purpose can be used by 
courts to fill in the blanks and adjudicate individual cases based on 
their unique circumstances. Furthermore, it is also clear that 
meaningful human agency can play an important role in promoting 
these safeguards and ensuring that automated systems do not just 
make correct decisions but also promote efficient decision-making and 
respect the privacy rights of individual welfare applicants. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
As shown throughout this Article, both MiDAS and SyRI had 
many failures. Some of the failures can be attributed to poor technical 
design, while others can be attributed to the failure to consider the 
impact on disadvantaged communities.377 Finally, many failures were 
related to the lack of proper human agency. Although this Article 
focuses on human agency, it is equally important to address each 
category of failures in order to fully understand the necessary changes 
that need to be made and assess the worthiness of future automated 
systems. 
In terms of human discretion, the aforementioned cases clearly 
demonstrate that discretionary street-level bureaucracy is vital for the 
smooth operation of a democratic society and that even with the most 
advanced technological capabilities some parts of the decision-making 
should be kept in the hands of humans—especially when the service at 
stake is so essential.378  
In a nutshell, in order to efficiently deliver public services and 
guard against the abuse of public resources, street-level bureaucrats 
need sufficient room to apply meaningful discretion. First, the breadth 
of the automated domain must be examined: what parts of the process 
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are automated, whether the system is automating a rule or a standard, 
and how much discretionary power is shifted to the engineers or to the 
IT itself. In this regard, MiDAS and SyRI are two different algorithms 
with different capabilities. MiDAS is a system-level bureaucracy, 
meaning an algorithm that automates a narrow domain, only fraud in 
unemployment benefits. And SyRI was a large-scale bureaucracy, an 
algorithm that investigated different types of welfare fraud. MiDAS is 
a decision-making algorithm, meaning that all parts of the process of 
detecting, investigating, and punishing for fraud are conducted by the 
algorithm. SyRI was a decision-aiding algorithm, it automated only the 
data collection and analysis part, and both algorithms automated a set 
of rules and standards where conflicts between them were inevitable. 
In addition, in both algorithms it is evident that discretion was shifted 
to the engineers and the technology, but the degree is not clear. Despite 
that, it can be concluded that both algorithms left room for street-level 
bureaucrats to apply discretion, although the room left by SyRI was 
wider.  
However, whatever discretion is left must also be meaningful. 
Analysis of the interactions between the caseworkers and the algorithm 
in MiDAS reveal that human discretion was not very impactful  
because street-level bureaucrats did not have a clearly defined role in 
the system. In SyRI, the discretion was more meaningful because  
the caseworkers had the final say. Nevertheless, human agency needs  
to be present throughout the process—not just in the final 
determination—to prevent the algorithm from becoming the de facto 
decision maker. Both systems should do more to allow the human in the 
loop to consider other policy considerations, such as data privacy and 
due process.  
The goal of this Article was to unpack the requirement for 
keeping humans in the loop and to outline the steps that policy makers 
should take in order to ensure sufficient and meaningful discretion is 
maintained. The role of street-level bureaucrats has been subjected to 
major changes over the years, and the use of advanced technology to 
constrain the capabilities of public officers suggests that we may be 
switching back to the traditional, tightly controlled public management 
approach. Given the failure of the traditional approach to adequately 
address the needs of the public, it is critical that the recent limitation 
of street-level bureaucrats be reserved. 
